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I. INTRODUCTION
"Cyberians"' are present at the creation of the jurisdiction of cyber-
space and at the closing of the electronic frontier.2 The concept of the
f Assistant Professor, University of Orlando School of Law. B.A. 1988, State Univer-
sity of New York, The College at New Paltz; J.D. 1991, Northeastern University School of
Law; LL.M. 1996, Temple University School of Law. The author would like to thank Ms.
Theresa McMahon for her comments on drafts of the article; Ms. Terri-Ann Gomez, the
faculty secretary at the University of Orlando School of Law, for her assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article; and Charles and Olga for their encouragement. The author would like to
thank the editors and staff of the Cornell Journal of Law and Policy for their patience and for
allowing him to revise this article shortly before it went to press. This Article stems from
Professor Gibbons's participation in the 1996 Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy Sympo-
sium: Regulating Cyberspace: Is Censorship Sensible? (Apr. 12-13, 1996). E-mail address:
<LGibbons @counsel.com>.
I See Part IH for a general definition and discussion of Cyberia. "Cyberians, as a general
rule, dislike capital letters, which require an additional stroke on the keyboard." Robert L.
Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace
through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Junmamrics J. 1, 3 n.6 (1994). This article will con-
form to this convention.
2 See id. at 10; HowARD RHEn GoLD, THE VmRTu.A Cor, y -- HoMasrADno oN
TaH ELEcrRoNic FRoNTMR 5 (1993); Daniel F. Burton, The Brave New Wired World, 106
FoREIGN POLicY 22, 36 (1997) ("The Internet is already home to a kind of Wild West ethos
that is often associated with new frontiers. It is antiauthoritarian, vehement in its defense of
individualism and free speech, radical in its concern with privacy, and, for the most part ex-
tremely antigovernmental.").
frontier has been a seminal one in the history of the United States, and
some scholars argue the defining one. 3 Historian Frederick Jackson Tur-
ner contended that the closing of the Western expansion of the United
States marked the second age of the United States. So too does the clos-
ing of the electronic frontier mark a new age in cyberspace and the for-
mal recognition of a post-industrial, post-service, global information
driven economy. For example, as early as 1978, "more than 51% of the
U.S. work force was employed in areas relating to information technol-
ogy earning 47% of the Gross Domestic Product (GNP). '" 4 "[T]aking
into account all aspects of the information industry section, the total [re-
cently] accounted for over 65 percent of the gross national product of this
country." s Cyberspace represents the future of the information industry.
As the closing of the Western frontier was marked by increasing federal
regulation of the West so too does closing the frontier that is cyberspace.
But the frontier experience, at least in the United States, had one positive
effect, the devolution of political power from Washington to the new
jurisdictions, called states, that were carved out of the frontier.6 In cyber-
space, the Communications Decency Act was viewed by many as merely
the first of many national attempts to impose regulation from without-
the real world-and the formal beginning of a closed frontier.
A. CYBERSPACE IN A STATE OF NATURE?
Some commentators have espoused the myth of a free and unregu-
lated cyberspace:
[i]n the world of Cyberspace... anarchy reigns. There
is no regulatory body, and computer users are capable of
anything. The Internet is a place where everyone is wel-
come, regardless of gender, age, race, or association....
Since there is no regulatory body policing the Internet,
the extent to which an individual is capable of [acting]
without restriction is an enigma.7
3 See generally FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1894); THE FRONTIER THESIS: VALID INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
HISTORY? (Ray A. Billington ed., 1966).
4 Harold M. White, Jr. & Rita Lauiria, The Impact of New Communication Technologies
on International Law and Policy: Cyberspace and the Restructuring of the International Tele-
communications Union, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1995) (citing JAMES R. TAYLOR & ELIZA-
BETH J. VAN EVERY, THE VULNERABLE FORTRESS: BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 25 (1993)).
5 RAYMOND T. NiMMER, INFORMATION LAW § 1.04 (1997).
6 A discussion of the effects of this process on the indigenous peoples of the West is
well beyond the scope of this article.
7 Barbara M. Ryga, Comment, Cyberporn: Contemplating the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 221, 224 (1995). See also William S. Byassee, Juris-
diction in Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE
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This is not the cyberspace that most Cyberians experience. Cyber-
space is a community of 71 million individuals8 which has so far relied
on a distinct culture of shared norms and common values to control their
behavior.9 Cyberspace arose out of the academic and research communi-
ties and reflects a culture in which axioms of First Amendment jurispru-
dence became the dominant value.10 Many Cyberians believe literally
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market,"'  or that "the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones;"12 yet, "no-one has a right to press even
'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient." 13 Although "the First Amend-
ment is a local ordinance" in cyberspace, Cyberians throughout the world
often invoke its talismanic force against those attempting to hinder free
and robust speech. The Cyberian community is probably the most hetero-
geneous population that has ever existed.14 The community is linguisti-
cally, culturally, economically, racially, and religiously diverse. 15
Cyberian infrastructures are constantly evolving. 16 The access providers,
content providers, software developers, the telecommunications compa-
nies, and the roadbed itself, are combining in seemingly infinite permuta-
FoREsT L. RFv. 197, 199 (1995) ("It has no central governing authority; it operates by infor-
mal agreement among all users and more formal agreement by the owners of a number of large
computers across the nation linked by high-speed telephone connection."). However, not eve-
ryone agrees with this position. Professor Nimmer contends that cyberspace is "over regu-
lated." Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1.02[4] ("The law of 200 nations applies in cyberspace; it
creates often conflicting demands and imposes values from multiple and diverse cultures onto
a single environment.").
8 John S. Quarterman, 1997 Users and Hosts of the Internet and the Matrix, MATiux
NEws, Jan. 1997, at 1. Cyberspace is growing at almost an exponential rate, so any measure-
ment is obsolete even before it's published. This article does not attempt to resolve the con-
flicting claims as to the size of cyberspace.
9 Dunne, supra note 1, at 8; George McMurdo, Netiquette for Networkers, 21 J. INFo.
ScIEN E 305 (1995) (discussing the basic commandments, suggestions, and rules for behavior
in cyberspace).
10 McMurdo, supra note 9, at 314.
11 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
[Tihe peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the
opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived
of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose.., the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
13 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
14 Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565, 565 (1996) ("Thirty-seven mil-
lion users in 161 countries connect to each other generating 100 million e-mail messages every
day.").
15 See id.
16 See James C. Goodale et al., Panel I: The Changing Landscape of Jurisprudence in
Light of the New Communications and Media Alliances, 5 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J 427 (1996).
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tions. 17 Similar to the experience of living on a real frontier, as the
community grows, the current informal methods of controlling behavior
may have to yield to the pressures of civilization, population, and, above
all, commerce.' 8 The putative needs of the growing commercial sector
of the Internet and the demands that it is making on governments is the
greatest threat to the existing libertarian paradigm in cyberspace.
B. TAMING THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
Today, forces internal and external to cyberspace are taming the
electronic frontier by establishing the first legal footpaths for "our" con-
venience. These forces, however, have no knowledge of either the vast
technological, social, and commercial entity of cyberspace 19 or of the
possible effects of the changes they are making. These tentative "foot-
paths" will define and shape the rules of the road for the evolution of
cyberspace.20 Unfortunately, the Communications. Decency Act21 is one
such footprint that may in the process of "protecting" individuals in
cyberspace obliterate free and robust speech. To make a frontier safe,
one must tame it. In the process of taming it, one must remove all sense
of danger and thus eliminate the unknown. The Communications De-
cency Act is also a paradigm of why government regulation is inappro-
priate for cyberspace. The CDA demonstrates the dangers of
17 See id. See also Cate, supra note 14, at 567 (observing that Internet not only crosses
global boundaries, but also regulatory ones; for example, it provides content like broadcasters,
carries content like the telcos, provides multiple channels like DST or cable TV, and delivers
mail and many traditional publications like magazines and newspapers like the post office);
Mark L. Gordon & Diana J. P. McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information Superhigh-
way, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 177, 184-188 (1995); White & Lauiria, supra
note 4, at 1-3.
18 See Dunne, supra note 1, at 8.
19 See Part V.A
20 This is not new. Each new means of communication faced its own outcries for regula-
tion. In 15th Century Venice, authorities were worried that "[c]orrupt printed versions were
driving out of the market the reliable old manuscript texts." Clary Corp. v. Union Standard Ins.
Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 486, 488 n.2 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERS 529-30
(1983)), review denied and ordered not published (Dec. 22, 1994). Emperor Frederick II de-
clared that contracts written on paper were invalid because parchment (sheepskin) was a more
dignified medium for recording legal documents. At the turn of the century, lawyers were
worried about the use of typewriters, see Benjamin Wright, The Law of Electronic Commerce:
EDI, E-mail, and Internet Technology, Proof, and Liability § 3.4 n.2 (2d ed. 1996), and tele-
graph, see John Robinson Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Em-
ploying Novel Communications Media, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1145 (1992) (citing WILLIAM
L. SCOTT & MILTON P. JARNAGIN, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF THE TELEGRAPHS § 296
(1868)). Today, we know such fears are totally groundless. We know because each new
communications medium had an opportunity to mature or time has subsequently proven such
regulation superfluous.
21 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133
(1996).
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government regulation of cyberspace-the greatest danger is the balkani-
zation of information (content).22
Current Internet regulators and infrastructure architects will not
know the full effect of their tampering for decades, and future users who
never experienced the wild electronic frontier will not realize what was
lost. The following is an example of what a physical superhighway can
do to existing communities:
[From 1950 to 1970], Robert Moses built roads,
bridges, parks and housing projects. Nothing stopped
him-not politicians, community leaders, urban plan-
ners, neighborhoods. Quite the contrary: he bribed poli-
ticians, intimidated community leaders, hired the urban
planners, and plowed under the community neighbor-
hoods. Anyway, in 1955 only a reactionary Luddite
would possibly oppose highway construction. The auto-
mobile was clearly the key to the future.
Your imaginary trip across the Cross Bronx Ex-
pressway won't show you the thousands of people
evicted from their homes, the old brownstone apartment
made over, the diverse neighborhoods cleaved by noisy
traffic arteries. Robert Moses did more to destroy New
York City than any one individual.23
Similarly, we do not know what effect the information superhigh-
way will have on the non-Cyberian communities. In cyberspace, nar-
rowcasting is the norm, in contrast to broadcasting in the real world.
'"Television, for example has become the common culture of those who
have grown up with it; it contributes to their sense of being members of a
nation .... [S]ocial and political leaders have looked to the media to
provide the social cohesion once supplied by public places. ' 24 Outside
of cyberspace, the media serves a legitimatization function and defines
the scope of public discourse. The "media" defines the terms of the de-
bate, and which sources are authoritative. Without a common language
and points of reference, public discourse is impossible. The possible ef-
fect of a world where "news" is narrowly cast is to fracture the polity
into increasingly smaller communities without a common language.
Other commentators have found that electronic networks facilitate polit-
ical ties across traditional socioeconomic boundaries and power differen-
22 See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (visited July 2, 1997) <http:ll-
wwww.whitehouse.gov/WH/Commerce/read.htm> (expressing the Clinton's Administration's
concern that content restrictions may become trade barriers).
23 CLIFFORD STOLL, SILICON SNAKE OIL 49 (1995).
24 PATRICK M. GARRY, SCRAMBLING FOR PROTECTON: THn NEw MEDIA AND T=E FIRST
AmmMNrENT 4 (1994).
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tials and that the network increased participation in civic life. 5 So, the
effect of living in a world of free and easily obtained information and
communication may weaken political bonds or tighten them. But
[t]he evolution of information and communications tech-
nology . . . will probably heavily favor nonstate enti-
ties . . . over states. The new technologies encourage
noninstitutional, shifting networks over the fixed bureau-
cratic hierarchies that are the hallmark of the single-
voiced sovereign state. They dissolve issues' and insti-
tutions' ties to a fixed place. And by greatly empower-
ing individuals, they weaken the relative attachment to
community, of which the preeminent one in modem so-
ciety is the nation state.2 6
Regardless of whether cyberspace is a broadcaster, narrowcaster, or
merely a common carrier, it has the potential to produce changes in ex-
isting geopolitical, social, and cultural institutions.
Governments already have the power to regulate cyberspace that is
coterminous with their geographical boundaries. But, it is not clear that
they can effectively regulate that portion of cyberspace without denying
their citizens its benefits.2 7 Software that allows parents or employers to
control access to sites on the Internet which they deem inappropriate may
be the prototype of instruments that allow governments to censor the
information available to their citizens on the net. As blocking software
becomes more prevalent and sophisticated, and PICS (Platform for In-
temet Content Selection) and other rating systems become standard, gov-
ernments may mandate that all the Internet service providers in a
country install blocking software to screen for content that is offensive to
the current regime.28 This mechanism will give governments the power
25 Michele Andrisin Wittig & Joseph Schmitz, Electronic Grassroots Organizing: Public
Electronic Network (PEN) Actions Group, 52 J. Soc. IssuEs. 53 (1996).
26 Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50, 66 (1997); but see Burton,
supra note 2, at 37 ("[lIt will be a networked world comprised of electronic communities of
commerce and culture-a world that ironically will strengthen the position of the United States
as a nation among nations, even as it disrupts the system of nation-states."); Barry Wellman, et
al., Computer Networks as Social Networks: Collaborative Work, Telework, and the Virtual
Community, 22 AMER. REv. Soc. 213, 231-32 (1996) ("Social networks are simultaneously
becoming more global and more local as worldwide connectivity and domestic matters inter-
sect,. Global connectivity de-emphasizes the importance of locality for work and community;
on-line relationships may be more stimulating than suburban neighborhoods and alienated
offices.").
27 Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the International
System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 651-53, 659-60 (1997).
28 Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, SciErrnc AMERICAN SPECIAL
REPORT (visited May 5, 1997) <http:llwww.sciam.com/0397issue/O397resnick.html> ("Singa-
pore and China, for instance, are experimenting with 'national firewalls'-combinations of
software and hardware that block their citizens' access to certain newsgroups and web sites.").
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to censor content that previously was only imaginable in a Kafkaesque
dictatorship. But the ability to impose order on cyberspace begs the
question of whether a sui generis law of cyberspace is really necessary
or even wise. Accordingly, denizens 29 of cyberspace must focus their
attention on providing a paradigm to govern this brave new world or
governance will be imposed from without.
C. FuTuRE GOVERNMENT IN CYBERSPACE
Any paradigm for governing cyberspace must be flexible, yet strong
enough to meet the challenges of the next century - and perhaps the
indefinite future. Further, this paradigm must contain a basis for adjudi-
cating disputes in cyberspace. The Cyberian community must accept the
"law" of cyberspace as legitimate and the enforcement of these laws as
just. An anarchistic self-regulating community developed Cyberian
norms and values. Rights in cyberspace focus on the power to "possess"
or control information. As with the real frontier, how we allocate rights
in cyberspace - and how we close it - will determine how we measure
justice and to whom this justice will be accorded. The existing ad hoc
process of rule making, fact finding, adjudication, and punishment is ill-
defined and amorphous. Few rules exist. Rules are established by mu-
tual agreement, and like the old West, each person defends his or her
own electronic homestead; violating the few rules that exist is punished
through technology, social forces, or by system administrators. The "ad-
judication process," once started, is swift and unappealable. The new
paradigm, however, must establish a rule making, fact-finding, adjudica-
tion, and enforcement process that is accepted as legitimate and is en-
forceable both in cyberspace and in the real world.
1. Life, Liberty, and Property in Cyberspace
In cyberspace, any division between "rights" and "property" is an
artificial and false dichotomy. Many of the legal issues raised in cyber-
space are traditionally intellectual property issues.30 For example, free-
29 Surprisingly, there appears to be very little academic literature regarding "citizenship"
in cyberspace or Cyberian communities. But see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Self-Governing Elec-
tronic Communities (Apr. 2, 1995) in COMPUTER LAw AssocIATION, THE 1995 COMPUTER &
TELECOMMUNICATION LAw UPDATE 59 (1995) (pagination in draft). This paper does not at-
tempt to resolve who is a "citizen," "resident," or "tourist" in Cyberia or cyberspace. The term
denizen was selected as being appropriately legally ambiguous. See THa AIERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 498 (3d ed. 1992) ("Denizen: (1) An inhabitant; a
resident. .. (2) One that frequents a particular place... (4) A foreigner who is granted rights
of resident and sometimes of citizenship.").
30 Professor Chon makes the point elegantly, "three men are standing at the end of a very
long pipe. Instead of being circular, it is C-shaped. One of the men says, 'I'm afraid, Inspec-
tor, this means that everybody and everything in the country has been copyrighted."' Mar-
garet Chon, New Wine Bursting From Old Bottles: Collaborative Ilternet Art, Joint Works,
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dor of speech implicates a property right in what is spoken, as speech in
cyberspace is always reduced to tangible form; thus, creating a copyright
(property) interest in pure speech. 31 "Property" in cyberspace is infor-
mation, and "power" is the ability to control information.32 The creation
and protection of property is a core function of government. 33 This is
especially true in cyberspace because "[w]hen contrasted with goods, in-
formation is unusual property. Economists describe it as 'public goods.'
Once released, further disseminations of information cannot be prevented
without the aid of law." 34
2. Legal Issues in Cyberspace
The law of cyberspace must address allocating rights and responsi-
bilities in cyberspace over:
(1) access - individuals not yet on cyberspace want access to the
network and others presumably will want to deny them access;
35
and Entrepreneurship, 75 OREGON L. REv. 257, 257 (1996) (describing a New Yorker
cartoon).
31 See Copyrights Act of 1976 § 102(a), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); MAI Systems Corp.
v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Loading software into RAM cre-
ates a copy under the Copyright Act.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he act of loading a program from
a medium of storage into a computer's memory creates a copy of the program."); 2 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08 at 8-105 (1983) ("Inputting a computer program entails the preparation
of a copy."); FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
UsEs OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, at 13 (1978) ("[T]he placement of a work into a computer is
the preparation of a copy.").
32 Property ownership is a bundle of the legal rights of control. Property rights are not
absolute. Unlike physical property (either real property or goods) which can be physically
possessed, property rights in information are intangible. Numerous individuals can possess the
same information. Once the secret is out, property interests in information can only be pro-
tected through statutory or contract rights. Therefore, the focus of property rights in informa-
tion is control over access and dissemination of the information. See Raymond T. Nimmer &
Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Beyond the Internet: Settling the Electronic Frontier, 6 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 25, 26-27 (1994). See also John Lienhard, Address Reflections on Information,
Biology, and Community, 32 Hous. L. REv. 303, 313-14 (1995) (suggesting the need to recon-
sider property rights in information); John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: a Framework
for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age, WIRED 2.03, Mar. 1994; Esther
Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED 3.07, July 1995.
33 See James Madison, Property, in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Robert A.
Rutland et al. eds., 1983). See generally Michael Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Rela-
tions Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REV. 769
(1985) (generally discussing the role of property and the creation of the social contract as seen
by John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau).
34 Nimmer, supra note 5, at 2.05 (1997) (citation omitted); but see Part VI.A.I.e (dis-
cussing technology based intellectual property protection).
35 Access may also include equal accommodation issues, for example an all-male or all-
female listserves. See, e.g., James W. Sweeney, SRJCN Bulletin Board Scrapped Teacher
Tires of Checking Computer Notes, PRESS DEMocRAT B1 (Feb. 11, 1995) (U.S. Department of
Education ruled the separate men's and women's bulletin boards violated civil rights laws);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective: Private
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(2) distribution - individuals may want to prevent information
from being distributed, or damages for the failure to distribute
information;
(3) contracts - individuals want others to live up to their commit-
ments on the net; and
(4) torts - defamation, libel, or assault.36
The question, then, becomes which form of governing cyberspace can
best protect the legitimate interests of Cyberians.
3. Models of Governance
This article will explore three possible models for regulating cyber-
space: no regulation, government regulation, and self-regulation. These
models are not mutually exclusive, and much like the real world, any
effective governance of cyberspace will be a mixture of all three. Ulti-
mately, the question is the proper mixture. No government regulation is
a null choice. Governments already regulate behavior, adjudicate dis-
putes, and provide remedies for wrongs committed in cyberspace. This
article advocates that before adding new levels of governance to cyber-
space, governments should first determine if existing government regula-
tion is adequate to protect government's sovereign interest in regulating
cyberspace. The government's interest should be measured by the exter-
nalities of the actions in cyberspace. As the effect of the Cyberian action
or inaction becomes greater in the real world so does that government's
interest in regulating the action or inaction. Implicit in this model of gov-
ernment regulation is the principle that most regulation in cyberspace
will be self-regulation. In determining the need for new regulation in
cyberspace, governments should apply a cost-benefit analysis to the new
regulation evaluating the costs of the existing uncertainty absent the reg-
ulation, and the costs and benefits that the proposed regulation would
have on Cyberian transactions.
Self-regulation may assume many forms that range from social con-
trol to formal contracts. Much regulation in cyberspace is already done
through informal social controls. This article examines the formal con-
tract based form of government as the legitimate model for creating insti-
tutions to which governments will grant some form of autonomy. A self-
regulation model based on contract law is appropriate because the con-
tract law model, when it represents the true meeting of the minds, best
fits the libertarian frontier traditions of cyberspace. A contract-based law
Speech Restrictions, Libel, State Action, Harassment, and Sex, 1996 U. CI. LEGAL F. 377,
390-96 (1996) (discussing the right to exclude participants).
36 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Networked Communities, 38
ViLL. L. REv. 349, 352 (1993). At the current state of cyberspace technology, battery and
other personal injury torts do not appear to be legal issues in the foreseeable future.
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of cyberspace facilitates the governing of cyberspace. Contract is, in es-
sence, private law-making. Contracts can provide for choice of law, fo-
rums, jurisdiction, and dispute resolution, thus avoiding the difficult
questions of which jurisdiction's laws will govern the dispute.37 Unlike
government, contracts made in the marketplace rapidly react to changing
economic, technological, or social circumstances. Yet, as in all govern-
ments (private or public), there must be effective checks on the primacy
of the new social contract or Cyberians may unwittingly contract away
their liberties. 38 The danger of the contract law model is that the same
standard from contract that establishes the right will also specify how
that right will be enforced. Cyberians must reject any attempt to shrink-
wrap governance in cyberspace by imposing a standard form contract of
adhesion as the model for contracting in cyberspace. Therefore, con-
tracting in cyberspace should be the quintessential negotiated contract
that represents a true meeting of the minds.
Ultimately, the strongest argument for self-regulation is that it
works. Under the current laissez-faire approach, cyberspace has exper-
ienced exponential growth measured by the total number of users, total
volume or dollar value of commerce, and the advancement of the tech-
nology. Further, the technology, software, and infrastructure has re-
sponded virtually instantaneously to meet every perceived need or to
protect against perceived dangers. Thus, experience in cyberspace mili-
tates for a hands-off approach by government.
II. EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE
IN CYBERSPACE
The term cyberspace is used to refer to communications via com-
puter networks. 39
37 See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
38 See Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration-Instrument of Private Government, 54
YALE L.J. 36, 68-69 (1944).
39 Senator Albert Gore - later vice-president of the United States - coined the term
"information superhighway" in 1978. The terms "information superhighway," "National In-
formation Infrastructure" ("NIL"), and "electronic highway" are used interchangeably. See
Gordon &. McKenzie, supra note 17, at 179 nn.2-3 (1995) (citing Daniel Pearl, Colliding
Clichis and Other Mishaps on the Term Pike, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1994, at A5). Regardless
of the clich6 currently in vogue, the information infrastructure functions as a "seamless web of
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that will put vast
amounts of information at user's fingertips. Development of the NII can help unleash an
information revolution that will change forever the way people live, work, and interact with
each other." Gordon & McKenzie, supra note 17, at 179-80 (citing White House National
Information Infrastructure Agenda for Action, Sept. 15, 1993). For general discussion of the
N11, see Ralph J. Andreotta, The National Izformation Infrastructure: Its Implications, Oppor-
tunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 221 (1995); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a
giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
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These methods [of accessing the Internet] are constantly
evolving and difficult to .categorize precisely. But, as
presently constituted, those most relevant to this case are
electronic mail ("e-mail"), automatic mailing list serv-
ices ("mail exploders," sometimes referred to as "list-
servs"), "newsgroups," "chat rooms," and the "World
Wide Web." All of these methods can be used to trans-
mit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving
video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a
unique medium-known to its users as "cyberspace"-
located in no particular geographical location but avail-
able to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the
Internet.40
This sense of place is so great that some Internet users refer to them-
selves as "Cyberians" and this electronic world as "Cyberia." Cyber-
space is the virtual (electronic) nexus, agora, marketplace, or town
square, where activity among computer users takes place. 41 Cyberspace
is the conceptual "location" of the electronic nexus between the individ-
ual, the networks, and other individuals. Cyberspace is a place "without
physical walls or even physical dimensions" in which interaction occurs
as if it happened in the real world and in real time; this is "virtual real-
works.... The resulting whole is a decentralized, global medium of communications - or
'cyberspace' - that links people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the
world."), aff'd 1997 WL 348012 (1997).
40 Reno v. ACLU, 1997 WL 348012, *5 (U.S.).
41 See Dunne, supra note 1, at 2-3. Cyberspace is a term originally created by science
fiction writer William Gibson in his short story "Burning Chrome." See generally William
Gibson, Burning Chrome, 4 Omm 72 (1982). However,
[i]n more than one article, an author asserts that the term "cyberspace" was
coined by author William Gibson in his 1984 novel Neuromancer. Although not far
off-target, this assertion is, in fact, incorrect. Gibson did indeed coin the term, but he
coined it for his 1982 short story "Burning Chrome."
What may confuse the occasional law-review editor is that the story "Burning
Chrome" was not published in any collection of Gibson's short stories until 1986.
Nevertheless, the story itself was published two years before Neuromancer, and our
citations should reflect this.
Mike Godwin, e-mail (May 3, 1996) <http:lmailmunch.law.cornell.edullistserveslCyberial
1532.html>;< http:lmailmunch.law.cornell.edullistserves/Cyberial1538.html>; and <http:ll
mailmunch.law.cornell.edu/listserves/Cyberia/1539.html> (visited Apr. 30, 1997).
Because the term was popularized from Neuromancer, this article will discuss cyberspace
as it exists in the world of Gibson's Neuromancer, in which individuals enter a different real-
ity, "cyberspace." Computers generate a "virtual reality", where individuals physically move
about in the data "matrix" to obtain information by controlling sensory stimuli. See Dunne,
supra note 1, at 3. In Gibson's vision, cyberspace is a "consensual hallucination that [was
experienced by the senses as] physical space but actually was a computer-generated construct
representing abstract data." Id. at 3 n.6.
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ity,"42 the manifestation of the "words, human relationships, data,
wealth, and power . . . by people using [computer-mediated
communications]. 43
Although spatial metaphors help describe the experience of living in
a Cyberian community, biological metaphors may more accurately con-
vey the reality.44 Culturally, socially, religiously, and economically di-
verse communities come together so that
the whole system is propagating and evolving ...
Cyberspace [is] a social petri dish, the [Intern]et [is] the
agar medium, and virtual communities, in all their diver-
sity, [are] the colonies of microorganisms that grow in
petri dishes. Each of the colonies of a microorganism-
the communities on the [Intern]et- is a social experi-
ment that nobody planned but that is happening
nevertheless. 45
And, it is constantly evolving. Therefore, cyberspace is an amorphous
jurisdiction without geographical or territorial limits, 46 and it may best be
measured by its "population," "infrastructure," and "commerce." This
article adopts an operational definition of cyberspace: All communica-
tions mediums which have at least the capability of accessing the Internet
and all users of such communications mediums are part of cyberspace,
even if their use or access is tangential. 47 Although the nation-state may
not be the best metaphor for cyberspace, this section will briefly examine
measures that are typically used to evaluate a nation-state: history,
demographics, infrastructure, constituent communities, government, and
revenue. These establish the existing institutional, social, and economic
framework that must be accommodated in any possible governance of
cyberspace.
42 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic Frontier, THE HUMAN., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 15.
43 RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 5.
44 Id. at 6.
45 Id.
46 See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1996-97) (describ-
ing a process of cyberzoning); Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 1997 WL 348012,
*22-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)(discussing
cyberzoning).
47 Cf. John S. Quarterman & Smoot Carl-Mitchell, What is the Internet, Anyway?, MA-
'nux NEws 4(8), Aug. 1994 <http://www.mids.org/what.html> (defining the Internet in terms
of technical specifications and access).
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A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CYBERSPACE'S MAIN STREET -
THE INTERNET
The "market street" that leads to cyberspace is the Internet.48 The
Internet is a network of networks.49 A good description of the Internet is
48 As with many aspects of cyberspace, the origin of the term "Intemet" is unclear. It
began to be used in the early 1980s to describe the interconnection of networks to form an
"intemetwork." KviN WERBACH, DirrAL TORNADO: THE INTERNr AND TELECOMMUNmCA-
TIONS POLICY, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, OPP
WORKING PAPER No. 29, 15 n.19 (Mar. 1997). There is no statutory definition of the Internet.
The 1996 Communications Decency Act for the purposes of limiting the dissemination of
proscribed "indecent" content defined the Internet as "the International computer network of
both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks." Id. at 12 (quoting
47 U.S.C. § 230 (1994)). See Figure 1 for a map of cyberspace. Figure 1 is reproduced with
permission from KEvIN WERBACH, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS POLICY, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, OPP
WORKING PAPER No. 29, 15 n.19 (Mar. 1997).
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49 RICHARD W. WIGGINS, THE INTERNET FOR EvERYONE: A GUIDE FOR USERS AND
PRovIDERs 5 (1994). The Internet is described as "[t]he largest, richest, and most diverse
region in cyberspace." See also Byassee, supra note 7, at 200. For an online history of the
Interet, see <http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/HIT.html>; ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 1997 WL 348012 (1997).
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controlled chaos. The Internet has no owner or central authority.50 The
unique characteristics of the Internet are its architecture and its fractal
nature. The Internet's architecture minimizes the importance of physical
location and classifications such as senders and receivers.5 ' The Internet
communicates using an adaptive system so that when one host is busy or
off-line, the Internet reroutes the message. Numerous "conversations"
can share the same physical facilities, and any host may communicate
with any other host.52 Because the Internet divides communications traf-
fic into packets dedicated point-to-point connections are unnecessary.5 3
The Internet has grown on an ad hoc basis that depended on the commu-
nications needs of the constituent networks. In 1981, the Internet was a
network consisting of 300 computers. 54 Over time, more networks and
users connected, forming a network of networks - the Internet. In
1989, the network consisted of over 90,000 computers.5 5 Since the early
1990s, the Internet has grown into a vast commercial network where
everything from software to pornography is available.56 Today, over
9,400,000 computers comprise the network.57 The Internet developed as
part of the Advanced Research Project Network ("ARPAnet") in 1969.58
ARPAnet was a Department of Defense initiative to assure network com-
munications even during partial outages.5 9 The ARPAnet model as-
sumes that the network is unreliable. 60 So, the routing and delivery
information is contained within the message itself.61 To send a
"message" (data) on the Internet, the server (source computer) places the
message in an "envelope" (Internet Protocol (IP) packet) and then ad-
dresses the envelope. As the message travels through communicating
50 WIGGINS, supra note 49, at 5-6; CYBERSOCIETY: COMPUTER-MEDIATED COIMMUNICA-
TION AND COMMUNITY 4 (Steven G. Jones ed., 1995) ("[N]o one group manages [the Internet].
Instead, a variety of groups, such as the Internet Society and InterNIC, circulate information
and resolutions and do research on the network's needs."); RiGTrrs AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
PARTICIPANTS IN NETWORKED COMMUNITIES 20, 133-34 (Dorothy E. Denning and Herbert S.
Lin eds., 1994) (noting the decentralized nature of the Internet).
51 Werbach, supra note 48, at 3.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd 1997 WL 348012
(1997).
55 Id.
56 Ryga, supra note 7, at 223. International Data Corporation estimates that one-in-three
Web surfers shops on-line. See Diane Trommer, IDC Reveals the Truth About Cybershopping,
ELECTRONIC BUY'S NEws, May 20, 1996, at 58 (Home Web shoppers spend on average $50
per month and business Web shoppers $500 per month; IDC estimated that there was $300
million in commerce on the Web in 1995 and predicts over $15 billion by the year 2000.).
57 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
58 ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE AND CATALOG 13 (2d ed. 1995);
Ryga, supra note 7, at 223.
59 Robert Craig Waters, An Internet Primer, 44 FED. LAW. 33, 33-34 (1997).
60 ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG 15 (Academic Ed. 1995).
61 Id.
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computers, it is routed correctly and, if necessary, rerouted based on the
envelope address; this is called "dynamic routing. '62 Dynamic routing
may deliver a message or even parts of the same message by taking dif-
ferent routes to the destination, depending on the most efficient path.63
Efficiency is measured by the length of time it takes to deliver the
message. Moreover, the routing is not geographically direct. A message
sent via e-mail from Berkeley, California to Seattle, Washington is fre-
quently routed: Berkeley, to Santa Clara, to Washington, D.C., to New
York, to Cleveland, to Chicago, to San Francisco, to Seattle. 64 This flex-
ibility is the Internet's greatest strength. But dynamic routing results in
two potential legal problems: (1) the sender does not know what route
the message will take and, consequently, what the sender's obligation to
the intermediate nodes that the message passes through; and (2) the inter-
mediate nodes handle traffic from sources they do not know. 65 The so-
phistication of Internet routing creates problems for localities, states, and
even countries that wish to exercise jurisdiction over these transient
packets. 66
The second unique characteristic of the Internet is its "fractal na-
ture."' 67 The telecommunications industry has developed sophisticated
statistical models to predict aggregate user patterns. But, these models
do not accurately reflect Internet usage.68 Internet usage does not follow
the traditional "poisson pattern but rather a fractal distribution. '69 The
"frequency of Internet connections, the distribution between short and
long calls, and the pattern of data transmitted through a point on the
network tend to look similarly chaotic regardless of time scale."' 70 Be-
cause of the fractal nature of the Internet, existing regulatory and eco-
nomic models established for other technologies are inapplicable to
cyberspace.71 Consequently, governments must be careful. Existing ex-
62 Perritt, supra note 36, at 352.
63 Id. at 352 n.7.
64 Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyberporn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community
Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 Loy. ENT. L.J. 415,
419 n.36 (1995).
65 Id. at 352. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 1997
WL 348012 (1997).
66 See, e.g., CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Richard S. Zembek,
Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of
Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J Sci. & TECH. 339, 355-56 (1996).
67 Fractals are derived from the branch of mathematics known as chaos or complexity
theory. Fractals exhibit "self-similarity"; in other words, a rough similar pattern emerges at
any chosen level of detail." Werbach, supra note 48, at 3.
68 Id.; Herbert Snyder & Douglas Kurtze, Chaotic Behavior in Computer Mediated Net-
work Communication, 32 HUMAN PROCESSING & MANAGEMENT 555, 561 (1996).
69 Werbach, supra note 48, at 3.
70 Id.
71 See id.
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perience in telecommunications regulation may not be generalizable to
cyberspace.
[F]ractals have valuable attributes. In a fractal entity, or-
der emerges from below rather than being dictated from
above. The fact that the Internet does not have an easily-
identifiable hierarchy or any clear organizational struc-
ture does not mean that all behavior is random. Many
small, uncoordinated interactions may produce an aggre-
gate whole that is remarkably persistent and adaptable.72
Accordingly out of the chaos on the Internet some form of order may
arise - in time.73
In the early 1980s, the National Science Foundation (NSF) sup-
ported five regional supercomputers which were linked to research uni-
versities by NSFNET in 1986.74 NSFNET quickly replaced ARPAnet as
the back bone of the Internet.75 NSF began the privatization of the In-
ternet when it contracted with the Merit Network, Inc. in 1987 to run and
upgrade the backbone of the Internet.76 In 1993, the process of privatiza-
tion was largely completed when NSF contracted with AT&T,77 Network
Solutions,78 and General Atomics for basic administrative services. 79
AT&T is responsible for directory and database services (keeping track
of how to locate people and resources). Network Solutions is responsible
for assigning Internet addresses (thus acting as a gateway and potential
choke point for) determining exactly which sites are granted permission
to join the high-speed network. General Atomics is responsible for net-
work services provided to network users (maintaining and modernizing
software for using the Net). The result was Network Information Center
(INTERNIC). INTERNIC was given permission to charge users other
than the United States research and education communities.8 0
After the NSF announced that it would not renew Network Solu-
tions Inc's exclusive right to allocate domain names, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) cosponsored a conference on restruc-
72 Id.
73 Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
74 RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 84. For an interesting time line of the Internet's develop-
ment, see Barry M. Leiner, et al., A Brief History of the Internet, <http:linfo.isoc.org/guestl
Zakon IlntemetfHistory/HlT.html>.
75 RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 84.
76 Id.
77 John Byczkowski, Online Internet Watcher Tries to Uncover Every Little Nook, CN.
ENQUIRER, Oct. 25, 1994, at B6.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 88.
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turing the Internet domain name system. 81 In May 1997, the Internet
Assigned Number Authority82 (LANA) and the Internet Society (ISOC)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-
MoU). 83 The Secretary-General of the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU) is the depository. for the MoU.84 The MoU requires
the creation of a gTLD (Generic Top Level Domain) Policy Oversight
Committee (POC).85 In addition to the IANA, ISOC, and LAB, the ITU
and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) are also repre-
sented on the gTLD-POC. 86 This is implicit recognition by two major
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) of the unique role of the ISOC,
the IAB, and the LANA. This international recognition of the ISOC,
IAB, and the LANA as international players may be the first tentative
steps to a unique legal status for cyberspace. Further, the ITU under
§ 4(c) of the MoU is obligated "to facilitate further cooperation in the
implementation of [the] MoU. ' '87
Under MoU, the creation of the seven generic top-level domain
names was accompanied by the creation of an alternative dispute resolu-
81 International Telecommunication Union, Press Release (ITU/97-8) at 80, Organiza-
tions Sign MoU to Restructure the Internet (visited June 20, 1997) <http://www.itu.int/PPI/
presslreleases/1997/itu-08.htm>. NSI's contract was due to expire in 1998.
82 LANA coordinates the assignment of port and the values for options with IPITCP and
other protocols. See David H. Crocker, Evolving the System, printed in, ITERuNmr SYSTEM
HANDBOOK 53 (Marshall T. Rose and Daniel C. Lynch eds. 1993), quoted in <http:ll
www.wia.org/pub/iana.html> (for a detailed history of U.S. DoD [Internet] Assigned Numbers
[Authority], Network Information Centers (NICs), Contractors, and Activities). IANA also
has the authority to supervise and control the creation and management of International Top
Level Domains (iTLDs). Alexander Gigante, Blackhole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the
Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 413, 416 (1997).
83 Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the
Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU) <http://www.iahc.org/gTLD-MoU.html>. Top
Level Domains are indicated by, for example, .com, .org, .edu, or .net. So in the email address
"user@aol.com," AOL is the second level domain, and .com is the top level domain.
84 Id. at § 5.
85 Id. at § 6.
86 Id. at § 6(g).
87 Unfortunately, time constraints do not permit a fuller or more considered exposition of
what this unique event does and may mean for the future of cyberspace.
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tion system. 88 The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center provides
procedures for resolving commerical disputes.8 9
[T]he WIPO Center administers procedures only. It does
not set law, nor does it create substantive rules. The rel-
evant law to be applied in the context of ADR comes
from other sources, such as the relevant national or re-
gional law. The WIPO center itself does not have juris-
diction to settle disputes, but rather to administer
procedures which facilitate the settling of disputes. 90
The WIPO Center will provide two types of alternative dispute reso-
lution services. The WIPO Center will provide (1) traditional arbitration
and mediation services, and (2) a novel procedure created by the IAHC
under the MoU, "Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels"
(ACPs).91 The ACP procedures are designed for domain name conflicts
and represent a fast, inexpensive, alternative to formal judicial
resolution.92
B. GOVERNMENT OF CYBERSPACE
Cyberspace has "evolved into a self-regulating, anarchistic commu-
nity with nobody in charge. ' 93 To the degree that there is any formal
legal authority for what is "done" on the Internet, it is possessed by IN-
TERNIC through a series of contracts with the United States govern-
ment. The closest entity to a governing body in cyberspace is the
Internet Society (ISOC).9 4 The ISOC is the voluntary membership or-
ganization that is responsible for running the Intemet.95 The mission of
88 An Open Letter from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the
Internet Community Concerning Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the
gTLD-MoU. (visited June 20, 1997) <http://www.wipo.int/eng/internet/domains-
openlet.htm>. The new gTLD's are: .store for businesses selling goods, .firm for businesses or
firms, .web for organizations related to the World Wide Web, .arts for cultural and entertain-
ment organizations, .rec for recreation/entertainment organizations, .nom for individual or per-
sonal sites, and .info for organizations providing information services. Trademark regulation
may be relaxed in the .nom domain. For example, McDonalds.nom should only refer to an
individual and not the international fast food frachise.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 STOLL, supra note 23, at 9. See also ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 832 ("No single entity-
academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit-administers the Internet.").
94 Gigante, supra note 82, at 416 ("Since the ISOC's formation, other Internet organiza-
tions have accepted it as the over-arching Internet authority."). Some scholars question
whether the ISOC and its member organizations have the legal ability to regulate the Internet.
See id. at 420-25 (providing an excellent diagram of the relationship between the organizations
and institutions that purport to regulate the Internet.).
95 STOLL, supra note 23, at 18.
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the ISOC is to promote information exchange through Internet technol-
ogy.96 The ISOC appoints the Internet Architecture Board (JAB) to ap-
prove standards and to allocate resources. 97 The voice of the Internet
Community is heard through the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). 98 In essence, the existing structure is a voluntary association
with each member free to accept all, some, or none of the benefits of
membership.99 The IAB standards are self-policing in that if the major-
ity adopts a new standard, the hold-outs may find that they are unable to
communicate with networks outside the hold-out community.
Similar to feudal fiefdoms, each region, subregion, college, or cor-
poration is responsible for policing its part of cyberspace. 100 Thus, "[i]n
network communities, rule setting and rule enforcement are highly de-
centralized. Typically, the rules are made and enforced at the local area
network (LAN) or 'campus network' level. The university or the corpo-
rations setting up the LAN or cluster of LANs is both the legislator and
the enforcer."'' 1 The constituent networks of the Internet usually estab-
lish Acceptable Use Policies (AUP) that controls the traffic traversing
their portions of the Internet. Generally, the rules prohibit harassment,
fraudulent use of accounts, unauthorized access to systems, or unsolic-
ited commercial advertisements.102
In addition to the formal AUPs, there is "netiquette"' 0 3 (network
etiquette), Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), or informal social norms
that define polite or acceptable behavior in cyberspace.' 0 4 There are nu-
merous "unwritten" conventions in cyberspace. For example, ALL
CAPITAL LETTERS is "shouting" or ":-)" means the sender is "kid-
ding."'105 The best description of current law making and enforcement in
cyberspace is that of a voluntary association with social disapproval
96 Id. See also <http://www.isoc.org>.
97 SrOLL, supra note 23, at 18.
98 Id. See also <http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us>.
99 STOLL, supra note 23, at 18.
100 WiGGiNs, supra note 49, at 21-22.
101 Perritt, supra note 36, at 352.
102 Wic iNs, supra note 49, at 21-22.
103 Id. at 22-23. "'Netiquette' is a recent neologism for 'networking etiquette'."
McMurdo, supra note 9, at 305-318 (discussing the "rules" of netiquette). See also Brendan P.
Kehoe, Zen and the Art of the Internet <http://www.itec.suny.edu/SUNY/DOC/Intemet/
zen.html> (a bit dated collection of the rules of netiquette along with other useful information
for those homesteading on the electronic frontier); STEVEN G. JoNs, ed., CYBERsoc=TY:
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS AND CoMMuNIry (1995).
104 Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JuRIMETRiCS J. 311, 313 (1995).
105 Id.; Cybershrink, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, 20-21 (Nov./Dec. 1995) (describing emoticons
used to substitute for visual cues and emotional inflections in cyberspace); McMurdo, supra
note 9, at 308-309.
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(flames) 106 being the common sanction.107 The usual punishment is so-
cial ostracism.'0 8 Individuals who are abusive may receive polite, pri-
vate messages from experienced users that explain why the behavior is
unacceptable, may find that their postings are ignored, or may be asked
to leave the discussion. Disconnection is the ultimate possible punish-
ment and results in exile from cyberspace. Disconnection can be either
horizontal (e.g., other networks in Internet refuse to communicate with
the offending site), or vertical (e.g., local service providers disable an
offending individual's access). 10 9 While there is some resort to civil or
criminal law (these attempts appear to be sporadic, at best),110 it appears
that the potential threat of civil or criminal sanctions is usually sufficient
when coupled with self-help or collective sanctions. 1 ' An example of
this was cyberspace's response to the Communications Decency Act,"12
numerous World Wide Web sites with sexually oriented content have
added some sort of filter from a de minimis java script warning the po-
tential viewer of the nature of the websites' contents and asking the po-
tential viewer if he or she is over 18 or is legally an adult in his or her
own country. Other websites require "Adult Checks" or other proof that
the viewer is legally an adult. Many of these sites are not subject to the
domestic laws of the United States, yet they are striving to comply with
U.S. law.
In sum, cyberspace needs no national defense and little law enforce-
ment because each individual is charged with protecting his or her own
Cyberian community. Further, existing governments have a vested inter-
est in protecting cyberspace - or at least in protecting their citizens'
economic interests in cyberspace.
Some criticisms of the current governance of cyberspace are:
106 Flames are "virulent and (often) personal attacks against the author of [an offending]
posting." KROL, supra note 58, at 590. Flames have been described as "severe criticism-the
digital equivalent of tarring and feathering someone on the net who has posted disagreeable
material." Jason Kay, Note, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Inde-
cency on the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 355, 384 (1995).
107 "Very little enforcement of rules on the Internet is done by formal action taken by
network authorities. Instead, peer pressure and the authority of local system administrators are
the main means of enforcement." WIGGINS, supra note 49, at 22. See also Julian Dibbell, A
Rape in Cyberspace or How an Evil Clown, A Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a
Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471, 484-85
(1994) (a detailed narrative of the events leading up to and after a "cyber-rape" on
LamdaMOO); Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Chal-
lenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1661 (1995).
108 Dibbell, supra note 107, at 480.
109 Dunne, supra note I, at 12.
11o Id. at 7-8; Zembek, supra note 66, at 357-58.
111 Cf Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?: An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J.
704, 725 n.47 (1931); Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Com-
plexities of Contract, 11 L. & Soc'y REv. 507, 519-20 (1977).
112 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994).
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(1) "It is too dependent on the goodwill of a small group
of people who are doing the job largely by historical ac-
cident, because they were in the right place at the right
time."
(2) "The most popular gTLDs are handled by an organi-
zation which holds a monopoly over registration and
award of those domain names. As Adam Smith pointed
out, a private monopoly is potentially worse than a pub-
lic one."
(3) "The current system is dominated by actors in just
one country, the United States to the exclusion of
others."
(4) "It does not give adequate attention to the protection
of trademarks and other intelle6tual property." And most
importantly,
(5) "It lacks formal structure and legitimization.""u 3
C. CONSTITUENT CoMUIurrIEs OF CYBERSPACE
Many communities collectively comprise cyberspace. 14 Cyber-
space communities are known in the research literature as Computer-
Supported Social Networks and are usually text based. 15 Because of the
limited social presence, on-line conversations tend to be more uninhib-
ited, creative, and blunt than face-to-face conversations." 6 To compen-
sate for this lack of social presence, Cyberian have adopted text based
signals called "emoticons" to convey cues which in other contexts are
conveyed through body language. The classic example of this is the ":-)"
or smiley face. The smiley face states the message should be read in a
jocular or non-serious sense. As in the real world, individuals are mem-
bers of different communities, and as in the real world, cyberspace com-
munities fracture internally, develop shifting coalitions, or are hostile to
outside groups." 17
113 Internet Governance: Towards Voluntary Multilateralism, Keynote Address by Dr.
Pekka Tarianne, 1TU Secretary-General (visited June 30, 1997) <http://www.itu.int/PPI/
projects/dns-meet/KeynoteAddress.htm>.
114 Not all individuals use all the possible resources in cyberspace. Some individuals may
only use E-mail, listserves, or the world wide web while others use Internet Relay Chat,
MOOs, and other facilities that build a sense of community. Many individuals limit their
access to Usenet newsgroups and exchanges information. This varying level of involvement
may have an impact on who ultimately is a Cyberian. The higher the individual level(s) of
social interaction and commitment to a Cyberian community, the more effectively the commu-
nity can apply social sanctions. See Perritt, supra note 36, at 360.
115 Wellman, et al., supra note 26, at 213.
116 Id.
117 .Perritt, supra note 36, at 360; Phillip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet,
TIm, July 25, 1994, at 50.
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Communities in cyberspace are defined largely by the technology
used to communicate within cyberspace. Some communities exist
largely as e-mail and may be as cohesive as a group of pen pals. 118
Other groups are highly interactive in real-time, for example the MUDS,
MOOs, and talkers. 119 In these communities, individuals develop per-
sona and exchange information in a virtual environment of their own
creation.120 Finally, some communities like the World Wide Web may
be a mixture of different types of communities. For some, the World
Wide Web is the old fashioned general store where people go to ex-
change gossip as well as goods; for others, the World Wide Web is
merely a modem shopping mall or a tourist center where one goes for
impersonal commerce or to see the sites. Depending on the individual's
relationship to the community which is largely defined by the technology
that makes the community possible, the individual may have a very sim-
ple connection to the community or a very complex relationship.
These communal loyalties affect how the individual relates to others
in cyberspace. Each community has its own customs and traditions,
which must be considered when developing a regulatory scheme for
cyberspace. Within any of these groups, there may be a few, or in the
case of Usenet, literally thousands of sub-communities, many of which
have nothing in common but those similarities forced on the community
by a shared technology. 121
D. DEMOGRAPHICS OF CYBERSPACE
The problem in determining the size of the Internet is in reaching
agreement on what is part of the Internet. 122 Estimates of the number of
118 Even communities that exist largely as e-mail, such as listserves, can be vibrant. On-
going debates and gossip from listserves are often a staple conversation when the individuals
meet in real life.
119 David Jacobson, Contexts and Cues in Cyberspace: The Pragmatics of Naming in
Text-Based Virtual Realities, 52 J. OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH 461 (1996).
120 Id. at 463-65.
121 Cf. Byassee, supra note 7, at 198-199 ("The exact boundaries of cyberspace are indis-
tinct, and many sub-communities have little interest or ability in communications with other
parts of cyberspace."); Peter Kollock & Marc Smith, Managing the Virtual Commons: Coop-
eration and Conflict in Computer Communities (visited May 1, 1996) <http://
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/csoc/vcommons.htm>.
122 Quarterman & Carl-Mitchell, supra note 47 at 4(8). In January 1997, Matrix Informa-
tion and Directory Service (MIDS) estimated that there were "36 million users of computers
that can distribute information by interactive TCP/IP services such as WWW of FTP ('core
Internet')," "57 million users of computers that can access information by interactive TCP/IP
services ("consumer Internet")," and "71 million users of electronic mail ("the matrix")."
Quarterman, supra note 8, at 1. Future projections for Internet growth for the year 2001 are
827 million Matrix users, 707 million Consumer Internet users, 436 Core Internet users, and
254 million Internet hosts with IP addresses. Id.
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users have ranged between three million and sixty million.123 But, con-
ventional wisdom dictates that cyberspace has been increasing at the
monthly rate of 15 percent, and currently, there are approximately 2.2
million computers and over twenty million users in 135 countries. 124
These numbers are expected to grow for the foreseeable future. 125
Nielsen Media Research (NMR) estimated that 37 million people in
the United States and Canada have access to the Internet either directly,
through a commercial ISP, or through a friend, and that 17 percent of the
population aged sixteen and older (24 million people) had, in the prior 3
months, spent an average of 5.5 hours per week on the Internet. 126 NMR
also estimated that 34 percent of the users are women, 66 percent ac-
cessed the Internet from work, and 25 percent of the World Wide Web
users had incomes in excess of $80,000. These statistics suggest a large
and relatively affluent Internet population.
E. REVENUE
Historically, the Internet was largely supported by government and
academic institutions who bore the infrastructure and administrative
costs. 127 Current usage patterns, particularly for individuals with Internet
access through a college or university, give the illusion that the Internet
is "free."'128 But there are no free riders in cyberspace. Although no one
pays for cyberspace, each network supports its part.129 "The NSF paid
for NSFNET. NASA pays for the NASA Science Internet. A college or
corporation pays for its connection to a regional network, which in turn
pays a national provider for its access."'130 Depending on the institu-
tion's function, the institution's traffic may be routed on either not-for-
profit or commercial routes. Research and educational institutions gener-
123 Julian Dibbell, Nielsen Rates the Net the Folks Who Measure TV Usage Produce the
First Solid Survey of the Internet. Their Finding: It's Nearly ready for Prime Time, TIME,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 121; Keith A. Ditthavong, Paving the Way for Women on the Information
Superhighway: Curbing Sexism Not Freedoms, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 455, 510 n.38
(1996) (discussing studies of Internet usage).
124 Ryga, supra note 7, at 223. As of July 1996, there were at least thirty-three nations
completely unconnected to the Internet. Wu, supra note 27, at 651."
125 Ryga, supra note 7, at 223.
126 Dibbell, supra note 123, at 121 (based on a telephone survey of 4,200 households in
the United States and Canada). Nielsen Media Research's methodology has been severely
criticized. Rajiv M. Rao, Nielsen's Internet Survey: Does it Carry any Weight?, FORTUNE,
Mar. 18, 1996, at 24. Critics claim that "the numbers are bunk" and allege that the survey
answers were weighted incorrectly to compensate for sampling errors. Id.
127 Lori Hawkins, Increased Net Surcharge Suggested: UT Researchers Say Higher Fees
at Peak Hours Might Ease Logjams, AusTim A ERIcAN-STATESMAN, Nov. 7, 1996, at Cl.
128 See DEPARTMENT OF DE-ENSE, THm NEXT GENERATION INTERNET: ANOTHER STEP IN
THE SuccEssFuL TRANSITION TO TM COMMERCIAL INTERNET (1996).
129 Dunne, supra note 1, at 19.
130 Id.
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ally use the National Research and Education Network (NREN).1 3 1
Commercial organizations generally contract with commercial Internet
providers. 132 Many institutions treat Internet access as an annual fixed
cost so that users are not charged based on volume. 133 Commercial prov-
iders account for the costs in setting access charges, and some providers
control costs by rationing the quantity or types of services. 134 The NSF
is progressing from a government supported Internet to a commercial
Internet.135 Because everyone must enter cyberspace through an Internet
Service Provider, tolls can easily be imposed at the "on-ramp." 136 Cur-
rently, there is some discussion of manipulating net usage through pric-
ing strategies to conserve infrastructure resources. 137 Unlike traditional
jurisdictions, which must raise revenue through taxes in order to support
building a national infrastructure or pay for essential services, all ex-
penses in cyberspace are paid through user fees. The high speed commu-
nications networks will be provided because the telecommunications
industry will find it profitable to charge users fees for access to the net-
work. Cyberspace, like self-supporting communal communities, de-
volves power to the lowest levels where that power will be effectively
utilized out of enlightened self-interest. Accordingly, the financing of
cyberspace is remarkably efficient and occurs without the coercive power
of the state exacting taxes or transferring wealth. 138
131 KROL, supra note 58, at 596. NREN is an attempt of the United States government to
combine the separate federal agency networks into a single high-speed network.
132 Id. For example, some of the major commercial providers are: Advanced Networks,
Services (ANS), Performance Systems International (PSI), and UUNET. In addition, there are
state and regional providers. These services are interconnected and interoperate legally by
using creative accounting agreements to allocate costs. Id. For a general discussion of the
"political economy" of cyberspace, see Jeffrey K. Mackle-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Economic
FAQs about The Internet (visited 5/20/97) <http://www.ipps.lsa.umich.edu/ipps/papers/info-
nets/EconomicFAQs/FAQs/FAQs.html>.
133 WIGGINS, supra note 49, at 21.
134 Id.
135 DEPRTmrrr OF DEFENSE, supra note 76, at 1.
136 If the reader examines Figure 1, he or she will note that it is impossible to enter
cyberspace except through an ISP.
137 See Hawkins, supra note 127, at Cl (Internet users may have to pay during peak hours
to prevent traffic jams.).
138 Some day, Cyberians may be faced with choosing between increasing user fees to
support universal access or tolerating a significant problem of free-riders. Cf. Werbach, supra
note 48, at 35 & nn.76-78 (quoting Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Recom-
mended Decision, FCC 96J-3, CC Docket No. 96-45, at 398 790-91) (The FCC convened a
federal-state joint board to recommend a funding source for universal service. The joint board
recommended that information and enhanced service providers do not have to contribute to the
universal service funding mechanism; but, ISPs that provide services to schools and libraries
are eligible for universal service subsidies.); see 47 U.S.C. § 254 (1994) (providing that all
interstate telecommunications carriers must contribute to universal service). This obviously
raises questions of equity.
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I. REGULATION, SELF-REGULATION, OR NO REGULATION
The regulation of cyberspace may take one of three forms. Cyberia
will be government regulated, self-regulated, or even unregulated. The
choice is not between an idyllic state of no regulation, self-regulation,
and government regulation, but which mixture of the three. This regula-
tion may be an addition to existing legal structures. Already, the virtual
denizens of cyberspace are subject to laws governing their physical dom-
icile - virtual crimes, torts, and breaches of contract can be punished or
remedied by the "real" courts of a temporal sovereign. 139 Additionally,
Cyberians are governed by the existing formal and informal social norms
of cyberspace and the rules of their ISPs.
If government regulation is to be the primary means of governing
cyberspace then are existing laws for "real space" harmonious in cyber-
space, or does cyberspace require a new regime of laws that are drafted
especially for the unique social, economic, political, and technical envi-
ronment that constitutes cyberspace?140 Initially, a sui generis law of
cyberspace is attractive, but the denizens of cyberspace are already sub-
ject to international, transnational, national, and local laws. As a general
rule, when the level of statutory and regulatory complexity rises, so do
transaction costs, while the certainty that any given Cyberian act is legal
decreases. 41 A sui generis law of cyberspace merely adds one more
level of complexity to the law and more confusion to an already unneces-
sarily complex legal system.142
The unstated assumption is that the model that solves the problem
with the fewest externalities and costs is the best - or, to paraphrase
Thoreau, the government that governs the least governs the best. 143 Two
rules should be considered when evaluating the propriety of new laws for
cyberspace. A first general rule is to examine existing law and determine
139 See, e.g., William S. Byassee, supra note 7, at 199; DAVID IcovE ET AL., CoMUTER
CRIME: A CRIMaFIG HR's HANDBOOK 205-349 (1996) (reprinting major federal, state, and
foreign computer crime laws); Zembek, supra note 66, at 346-47.
140 I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. Prrr. L. REv.
993, 995 (1994).
141 Legal uncertainty is reflected in the market price of access, content, and goods sold in
cyberspace. Because everyone in cyberspace is potentially both a publisher and consumer of
content, individuals who provide content at low or no-cost may decide not to provide content
until the legal status of the content or transaction is established. This phenomenon is clearly
demonstrated by the chill which the Communications Decency Act of 1996 places on informa-
tion transactions in cyberspace. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 830, 877-78 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (Dalzell, J., supporting opinion), aff'd 1997 WL 348012 (1997).
142 Unless the new sui generis regime of laws displaces or preempts existing law for the
"real world.' Cf. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1.102[4].
143 "I heartily accept the motto, 'That government is best which governs least'; and I
should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally
amounts to this, which also I believe, 'That government is best which governs not at all."'
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CivIL DISOBEDIENCE 1 (1849).
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whether it fits into the paradigm of cyberspace. Also, examine whether
the purposes and policies behind the existing law efficiently effectuate
the same purposes and policies in cyberspace. 144 A second general rule
is to balance the costs and benefits of enacting special legislation for
cyberspace. 145 Therefore, if existing ambiguous legal relations do not
impose significant costs on routine behavior, then a special law of cyber-
space is not justified. However, if the ambiguous legal relationship im-
poses significant costs on routine behavior, then a special law of
cyberspace may be justified.146 Because existing law either literally, by
analogy, or by metaphor applies to cyberspace, rarely will sui generis
laws for cyberspace be justified.
The criticism of the law and economics approach is that it is value
neutral. 147 In cyberspace, this is also the approach's strength. "Thirty-
seven million users in 161 countries connect to each other generating 100
million e-mail messages every day."148 Each of those 161 countries has
its own domestic laws, customs, religious beliefs, and morality. Within
these countries, there are numerous subcultures, each with distinct varia-
tions on the national culture. Sometimes these subcultures exist in appo-
sition or opposition to the dominant culture. To impose a culture on
cyberspace would be to balkanize it.149 The law and economics ap-
proach has the advantage of respecting individual differences, thus
resolving values and moral issues in the marketplace of cyberspace.' 50
Each ideology, value, code of conduct, or custom may compete freely for
acceptance in the marketplace. Some values will fall by the wayside,
others will be assimilated, and still others will remain in active competi-
tion to become the dominant paradigm.
144 Hardy, supra note 140, at 996; David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Elec-
tronic Data Communications onto Our Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Con-
science (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 ViL. L. REv. 487, 515 (1993).
145 Hardy, supra note 140, at 998.
146 Id. The costs do not have to be economic costs. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992)("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurispru-
dence of doubt.").
147 See generally Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral
Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 431 (1996); Lawrence
M. Friedman, Two Faces of Law, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 13, 15-16 (1984). Admittedly, this posi-
tion is not neutral to the proposition that competition and free markets solve most problems,
but every theory must have at least one axiom.
148 Cate, supra note 14, at 565.
149 Cf Lemley, supra note 104, at 321.
150 In a community that is defined solely by its communications media and ease of com-
munication, transaction costs may be so marginal as to render the "law" irrelevant. See Lewis
A. Komhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order? Order Without
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 647 (1992) ("Economic analysts of
law have argued that law is important only when 'transaction costs' are sufficiently high.").
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IV. NO REGULATION
The no regulation model is a null choice because, in cyberspace, the
idyllic state of nature never actually existed. 151 Cyberspace is an acci-
dental byproduct of United States government research. 152 Conse-
quently, the United States government has always placed some
regulation on cyberspace. 153 For example, the NSFNET Backbone Serv-
ices Acceptable Use Policy prohibits the commercial use of NSFNET.154
At all times the physical bodies of Cyberians could be punished for their
cyberspace activities should some "real" government choose to exercise
such control. 155 Yet, governments rarely attempted to extend their juris-
diction into cyberspace. But this policy of benign neglect has changed.
Governments are now interested because many individuals who are cur-
rently using the Internet can afford to invoke the judicial system to re-
solve disputes. The popularization of the information superhighway has
educated both judges and legislatures that this is a place where real
wrongs take place - wrongs that are worthy of a remedy. 156 Besides
government regulation, cyberspace has always had self-imposed regula-
tions. Because cyberspace has always been regulated, this fact leads in-
evitably to the question of whether a sui generis law of cyberspace is
needed or even wise.
V. GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Already, nations are aggressively attempting to regulate cyber-
space. 157 This regulation takes two forms: enforcing laws of general ap-
plicability in cyberspace and creating new laws to govern cyberspace.
The legal enforcement model uses positive law enforced through admin-
istrative agencies and the courts. 158 There is very little to be said for this
approach. The futility of a nation-state approach to law, jurisdiction, and
dispute resolution is best shown by some cyberspace aphorisms - for
151 See generally LANCE ROSE, NE-hAw: YOUR RIGHTS IN Ta Or'u-E WORLD, XVi
(1995).
152 See supra Part ll.B.
153 The United States government has at least regulated those portions of cyberspace that
it financially supported. But many, if not all, of the original settlers first explored cyberspace
from a college, university, or research institution, so they were governed by these rules.
154 See KROL, supra note 58, at 575.
155 See id.
156 ROSE, supra note 151, at xvi.
157 In the News: Governments Move to Control the Free Flow of Information on the Net,
1 CYBERSPACE L. 27-29 (1996) (discussing the Peoples Republic of China. France, Germany,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United States, Vietnam, and the European Commission); See also
Human Rights Watch Report, Silencing the Net: The Threat to Freedom of Expression On-
Line, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 1996 Vol; 8, No. 2 (visited April 26, 1997) <http:ll
www.netfreedom.org.au/anoid/nfhwr.html>.
158 Perritt, supra note 36, at 355.
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example, "In cyberspace, the First Amendment is merely a local ordi-
nance"'159 or "National borders are mere speed bumps in cyberspace."' 60
In cyberspace, distance is measured in nanoseconds 161 - not miles. So-
cial interaction or commercial transactions on a transnational level are
possible with an ease heretofore only imagined by science fiction writers
who dreamed of teleportation devices. 162 Accordingly, one is as likely to
have an international dispute as a national one. The function of dynamic
routing and facilities such as the World Wide Web, File Transfer Proto-
col, and remote log-on/telnet permit a user to enter, or at least to cross
numerous national, state, or local borders without either the user or na-
tional authorities being aware of the user's passage. 163  Therefore,
"[t]raditional notions of jurisdiction are outdated in a world divided not
into nations, states, and provinces but networks, domains, and hosts."'164
Trying to regulate cyberspace on a country-by-country basis is doomed
to fail because it is inefficient and does not account for the inherent na-
ture of the technology. 165 "The Internet is wholly insenstive to geo-
graphic distinctions. In almost every case, users of the Internet neither
know nor care about the physical location of the Internet resources they
access. Internet protocols were designed to ignore rather than document
geographic location."' 66 "[T]he unique nature of cyberspace necessitates
uniform national treatment and bars the states from enacting inconsistent
regulatory schemes."' 167 Similary, the unique nature of the cyberspace
requires a uniform global system of regulation should bar nation-states
from enacting inconsistent national legislation.
159 John Perry Barlow <http://www.lexmark.com/data/alpha-b.html>.
160 Timothy C. May <http://boojie.rt.csuohio.edu/-31337/cun/cun07-16-96>.
161 A nanosecond is one billionth of a second (10). THE AMErucAN HERITAGE DICrnON-
ARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 15, at 1200.
162 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996); Dept of
the Treasury, Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce (visited April
25, 1997) <http:llwww.ustreas.govltreasury/intemet.html> ("These new technologies, particu-
larly communications technologies including the Internet, have effectively eliminated national
borders on the Information highway.").
163 Matthew R. Burnstein, Note, Conflicts On the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 81-82 (1996). "For example, hypertext on the
World Wide Web enables users to 'visit' one location (called a page or site), where they are
then presented with an opportunity to visit any of a number of other locations-in any of a
number of other countries." Id. at 82.
164 Id. at 81. But see Zembek, supra note 66, at 367.
165 Cf. American Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 97-Civ.-0222(LAP) (S.D.N.Y.) (visited July 1,
1997) <http:llchronicle.com/che-data/focus.dir/data.dir/0623.97/ala.htm> (holding that the
unique nature of the Internet prohibited state regulation under the Commerce Clause).
166 Id.
167 Id.
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A. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: COLONIALISM
IN CYBERSPACE?
Most attempts to regulate cyberspace have been imposed from
without. Governments so far have not attempted to work within Cyber-
ian structures to build a consensus for their policies nor have they at-
tempted to work through Cyberian elites. This creates the perception that
outsiders1 68 are attempting to regulate cyberspace which Cyberians reject
as illegitimate "[i]t is.... as though 'the illiterate could tell you what to
read."" 169 This disconnect between the governors and the governed
quickly lead to analogies between the colonial powers and indigenous
people, and ultimately, "A Declaration of Independence of Cyber-
space." 170 As John Perry Barlow stated in A Declaration of Indepen-
dence of Cyberspace
Governments derive their just powers from the consent
of the governed. You have neither solicited nor received
ours.... You have not engaged in our great and gather-
ing conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our
marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics,
or the unwritten codes that already provide our society
with more order that could be obtained by any of your
impositions.171
The CDA was not the first attempt by government to regulate cyber-
space 172 , but it was the attempt that defined Cyberia as a community-in-
opposition. The United States pioneered the Internet and plays an impor-
tant role in the future development of the Internet.' 73 Other countries
may model their domestic and international cyberspace policy on the
United States expecting that the United States "as the inventor of the
Internet and the world's foremost technological superpower [should] take
the lead in creating the policy framework for the new world."'174 The
Cyberian community rejected the Communications Decency Act because
168 For example, the Communications Decency Act's sponsor in the United States Senate,
Senator J. J. Exon, never entered cyberspace until shortly before defending the CDA on the
Senate floor. See Paul Goodsell, Exon Went On-Line Before Vote Experience Helped In De-
bate on Porn, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 16, 1995, at 2. Bob Peters of Morality in Media
admitted that he had never been on the Internet and had declined numerous offers for a tour of
cyberspace. See Robert Peters, Remarks at 1996 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Symposium: Regulating Cyberspace: Is Censorship Sensible? (Apr. 13, 1996).
169 John Perry Barlow <http://132.74.18.2/-dkalekin/declarl.txt>.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See notes 28, 157 & 187.
173 Burton, supra note 2 at 30.
174 Id. at 31. The United States accounts for approximately two-thirds of the world's
Internet users and hosts. Id at 32.
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it was a paradigm for illegitimate government regulation in cyberspace.
Accordingly, Cyberians chose the CDA as the issue on which to take a
stand.
A premise of democracy is legislation without representation is tyr-
anny. The Cyberian community is large and politically aware. There are
numerous lobbying and interest groups that represent Cyberians or at
least have a colorable claim of representing some segment of the com-
munity.' 7 5 Yet the United States Congress passed the Communications
Decency Act without hearings. 176 So the voice of the Internet commu-
nity was not heard.' 77 Prior to passage, the Clinton administration ex-
pressed its view to Congress that the CDA was unnecessary because
"existing laws already authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscen-
ity, child pornography, and child solicitation."' 178 Finally, the law as
passed was unconstitutional. Attorney General Janet Reno wrote a letter
to House Speaker Newt Gingrich that the United States Department of
Justice considered those portions of the CDA that prohibited the inter-
state transmission of communications on the topic of abortion was a vio-
lation of the First Amendment.1 79 Thus the CDA was an unnecessary sui
generis law for cyberspace passed without hearing from the Cyberian
constituency, developing a record that the CDA was appropriate for the
unique conditions of cyberspace, and added unnecessary complexity and
ambiguity to legal relations in cyberspace without any corresponding
benefits. In sum, the CDA is the model of what this article contends that
legislatures should not do in cyberspace. 80
175 For example, the American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Computer Professionals for So-
cial Responsibility, America Online, CompuServe, Netcom, Prodigy, Internet Society, etc.
176 See S. Rep. No. 104-23 9 (1995); Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem,
The State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892 before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995).
177 This presupposes the voice of Cyberians in the United States would be adequate to
represent a global community.
178 ACLU, 1997 WL 348012 *17 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S8342 (June 14, 1995) (letter
from Kent Marcus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Sen. Leahy).
Tellingly, after the CDA was declared unconstitutional, the Clinton Administration changed its
Internet policy again. Jeffrey R. Young, New White House Internet Policy Avoids Regulation
of Content, CHRON. HIGHER ED. A20 (July 11, 1997). The new policy called for a "system of
content ratings and filtering technology" consistent with the First Amendment. Id.
179 142 Cong. Rec. S1598-03, *S 1599 (Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General to Newt
Gingrich); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 829 (1996) ("the Department has a longstanding
policy that [limitations on the discussion of abortion] are unconstitutional and will not be
enforced", and that both President Clinton and Attorney General Reno "have made th[e] point
clear" that no one will be prosecuted under "the abortion-related provision").
180 Shortly before this article went to press, the United States Supreme Court in Reno v.
ACLU declared the challenged portions of the CDA unconstitutional. 1997 WL 348012, *10
(affirming the district court's injunction against the government enforcing 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 223(d)(1)-(2) and § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) insofar as it relates to "indecent" com-
munication). Further the Clinton Administration stated that it "supports industry self-regula-
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B. TRADITIONAL CHOICE OF LAW REGIME
Rather than create a sui generis law for cyberspace, nations may
decide to treat cyberspace as a special type of transnational transaction
and subject any dispute arising from the transaction to traditional choice
of law analysis (in order to decide whose law and which forum will adju-
dicate the dispute). Countries could apply either the law of the place of
the wrong or the law of the place with the most significant relationship to
the transaction. 181 In cyberspace (because of dynamic routing and the
conceptual difficulties of applying a land based geographic metaphor),
when applying the law of the place of the wrong to cyberspace, the
"place of the wrong" will often be indeterminable or at least hotly con-
tested. If the place of the wrong cannot be determined, the tribunal will
most likely apply to law of the forum adjudicating the dispute.' 8 2
The second option is to apply the law of the jurisdiction with the
most significant relationship to the dispute. This approach is also prob-
lematic. Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of
Laws applies a nebulous seven-factor balancing test.183 Section 145 re-
quires courts to consider:
(1) the needs of interstate and international system;
(2) the policies of the forum;
(3) the policies of other interested states;
(4) the expectations of the parties;
(5) the core policies underlying the law;
(6) the certainty and uniformity of result; and
(7) the ease of determining and applying the law.' 84
These factors are not easily balanced in cyberspace. 185 Therefore, there
is no simple and fair test to anticipate which jurisdiction's laws will gov-
ern a particular transaction. For example, the moment the tort is commit-
ted, every country on the Internet has at least a tangential connection to
the tort because of their connection to cyberspace.
tion, adoption of competing ratings systems, and the development of easy-to-use technical
solutions." A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (visited July 2, 1997) <http://
wwww.whitehouse.gov/WH/Commerce/read.htm>.
181 Bumstein, supra note 163, at 93-94.
182 JId
183 Id.
184 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 145 (1971).
185 The author leaves it to the reader's imagination about the possible permutations using
the World Wide Web. The paradigm could be this simple. User in country A accesses Web
page in Country B that is linked to Site in Country C. Now, assume a content on Site is illegal
in country A. What are the interests of countries B & C? What are the interests of Web page
and Site?
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C. CYBERALTY (ADMIRALTY AND MARINE LAW)
Over centuries, laws have developed to govern one truly transna-
tional space, the open sea. Traditionally, nations do not claim sover-
eignty over the sea in excess of their costal waters. 186 Similarly, nations
may be willing to forego claiming sovereignty in the transnational nature
of cyberspace. Admiralty and Maritime laws originated because many
maritime transactions threatened to escape regulation because they were
not linked to physical places within national law systems. 187 Similarly,
transactions in cyberspace are escaping regulation because they have lit-
tle connection to national law systems. As a general principle of mari-
time law, the law of the nation where the vessel is registered governs the
vessel while it is in international waters. 188
The most important principle to recognize is that 'the
general maritime law is not the law of any particular
country but is part of the law of nations.' The analogy is
clear: cyberspace, like the high seas calls for a unified,
common understanding of the law to be chosen to adju-
dicate disputes. 189
Under maritime law, the law follows the flag. By analogy in cyberspace,
the law could follow the ISP. The law governing any particular transac-
tion would be the law of the jurisdiction where the individual entered
cyberspace. 190 This would be the applicable law notwithstanding the na-
tionality of the individual.' 91 By attributing the sovereignty of the ISP to
the individual user, this model avoids the difficulty of riogin or telnet,
192
which renders the geographical location of the user irrelevant.
186 See, e.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 19, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
187 See generally Perritt, supra note 36.
188 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200,450 U.N.T.S. 82; THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 1-12 (2d
ed. 1994).
189 Burnstein, supra 163, at 104.
190 Cf. Jane C. Ginsberg, Global Use/Territorial Rights: Private International Law Ques-
tions of the Global Information Infrastructure, 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 318, 322 n.l1
(1995); A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (visited July 2, 1997) <http:ll
wwww.whitehouse.govWH/Commerce/read.htm> ("The rules of the 'country of origin'
should serve as the basis for controlling Internet advertising to alleviate national legislative
roadblocks and trade barriers.").
191 See id. (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953)) ("The nationality of the
vessel for jurisdictional purposes was attributed to all her crew.").
192 Rlogin or telnet permits users to access and use computers from remote locations. For
example, the author frequently accesses his computer account in Massachusetts from Florida.
Under this model, if the author accessed cyberspace from his Florida account, then Florida has
jurisdiction. If the author telnets to Massachusetts and accesses cyberspace from that account,
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Unfortunately, this approach still does not resolve conflicts among
users entering cyberspace from ISPs licensed in different countries or
ISPs flying flags of convenience. 193 If there is a dispute between indi-
viduals accessing cyberspace through different national ISPs, this dispute
must be resolved through some choice of law paradigm. But, existing
choice of law rules do not fit neatly into cyberspace. Further, this could
create a race to the bottom. Countries that are information poor or which
do not produce substantial intellectual property could become flags of
onvenience for ISPs. These countries could refuse to recognize intellec-
tual property or property interests in one's reputation.1 94 Sophisticated
users could then riogin or telnet into a data haven and then hoist the
"Jolly Roger" and engage in intellectual or reputational property piracy
with little danger of being punished in his or her geographical place of
domicile. Nations may decide to pierce the ISP veil to insure that their
domicillairies are complying with the local national law. While the tradi-
tion of the law of the sea clearly demonstrates that nations can yield
sovereign authority in transnational space, this process has taken centu-
ries and a complex regime of at least 63 different treaties (in addition to
tradition and custom) that in some way address rights, duties, or privi-
leges involving maritime law.195
D. A CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF CYBERSPACE: THE
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
The International Telecommunications Union is a specialized
agency of the United Nations that is responsible for the regulation of
international telecommunications. 96 This existing structure could fore-
shadow international regulation of cyberspace. Already, the ITU co-
sponsored a conference to resolve a major dispute over generic top-level
domain names, and in doing so, internationalized a process that once was
solely a United States domestic matter. Morever, there are numerous
multinational conventions that govern international transactions. 197
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that individual countries will surrender that
then Massachusetts has jurisdiction even though the author was physically in Florida at the
time.
193 Nor does it guarantee that there will be a person there to exercise jurisdiction over.
194 See Dan L. Burke, Patents in Cyberspace, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1993) (noting that
some nations have no patent law at all).
195 Louis B. SOHN & KmsTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL, at
xxiii-xxxvi (1984) (listing treaties, conventions, and agreements between 1883 and 1980).
196 See White & Lauria, supra note 4, at 2.
197 See Bumstein, supra note 163, at 113 & nn.234-243. For Cyberians, international
agreements that eventually govern other frontiers: outer space, the moon, or Antarctica (i.e.,
"regions within the reach and use of nations but not easily demarcated into jurisdictions") may
foreshadow the future law of cyberspace. Conversely, nations may use the law of inner-space
(cyberspace) as a model for closing the remaining frontiers.
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degree of sovereignty over individuals who are physically present within
the geographical boundaries of the country that is necessary to create a
public law of cyberspace. Secretary-General Pekka Tarjanne of the ITU
stated that the
central strategic challenges' facing the ITU today is the
need to adopt the 'principles and presuppositions of na-
tional sovereignty and multilateralism .. .' to the reali-
ties of a telecommunication industry which is creating
the global information society of the future. 198
A pragmatic option is a treaty that establishes a private law of cyber-
space.199 Such a treaty could formally recognize the right of Cyberians
to engage in private law making and private ordering of their own affairs.
Nations already allow for the private ordering of international commer-
cial transactions. The Convention on the International Sales of Goods
(CISG)200 permits parties to enter into enforceable contracts for the sale
of goods, and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention) 20 1
permits parties to create their own private courts to enforce private laws.
Under a treaty, nations could formally grant broad authority to individu-
als in cyberspace and create an international body to study the effects and
make suggestions for improving the treaty over-time. Already, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
has drafted a model law that encourages the used of international con-
tracts to facilitate electronic commerce.20 2 Because cyberspace is the
modem equivalent to the traditional marketplace or agora in that it is a
marketplace of intellectual property, goods, services, and "speech," the
Convention should enshrine fundamental principles of human rights that
may not be waived.203
198 White & Lauria, supra note 4, at 30 (quoting Pekka Tarjanne, The ITU Responds to
New Concepts for Public Policy in the Global Information Society, 20 INTERMEDIA 6, 13
(1992)).
199 The United States and the European Union would support a private law of cyberspace,
at least in principle. See A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (vistited July 2, 1997)
<http:llwwww.whitehouse.gov/WH/Commerce/read.htm>; EU Council of Ministers Conclu-
sions: 12102/96, TiE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT (Nov. 29, 1996).
200 U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, FINAL
ACT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980).
201 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-208
(West 1992).
202 A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (vistited July 2, 1997) <http://
wwww.whitehouse.gov/WH/Commerce/read.htm>.
203 In keeping with the political traditions of the United States that civil rights are protec-
tions from government (and not one's fellow citizens), the Clinton Admistration's "A Frame-
work for Global Electronic Commerce" seeks to open a dialogue to ensure that national
regulation does not serve as disguised trade barriers. In cyberspace, speech may need protec-
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VI. NON-GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE
Self-government or self-regulation is usually justified if it is: (1)
more efficient; (2) the rules or adjudicatory procedures differ from the
surrounding community; (3) the rules of the surrounding community are
inapplicable; or (4) compliance with the rules of the community is
higher, if the rules are self-enforced. 20 4 Although all four factors support
a self-regulation, this section will focus on the first. The jurisdictional
and sovereignty issues in cyberspace makes it difficult for territory based
nation states to enforce their laws on cyberspace. Even if jurisdictional
issues are solved, the infrastructure of cyberspace is evolving too rapidly
for governments to regulate efficiently. 20 5 The unique technical and
transnational nature of cyberspace justifies self-government. The apho-
rism that technology leads and the law follows best expresses this point.
"It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the law is behind the
times. ' 20 6 In 1915, the United States Supreme Court held that motion
pictures were "spectacles, not to be regarded ... as part of the press of
the country or as organs of public opinion. '20 7 And again, in 1968, a
federal court held that "the public has about as much real need for the
services of a CATV system as it does for hand-carved ivy back-scratch-
ers. '" 20 8 "Prosecutors and judges generally are not familiar with the cul-
ture and norms of the Internet. They may lack the technical expertise
necessary to identify and prosecute offenders. '20 9 Overall, the legisla-
tures, regulatory agencies, and courts do not appear to be percipient in
tion from both government and citizenry. Nelson Mandela observed that "In the 21st century,
the right to communicate will be the main human right." Sean Selin, Comment Governing
Cyberspace: the Need for an International Solution, 32 GONZ. L. Rv. 365, 365 (1996-97)(ci-
tation omitted).
204 Perritt, supra note 29, at 31; see also Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care
About Computer Crime, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 465, 477-490 (1997).
205 SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7 (1983) (recognizing the essential chal-
lenges of analogizing new technology to existing law); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CON-
STrruTIoNAL LAW 1007 (2d ed. 1988) ("The rate of technological change has outstripped the
ability of the law, lurching from one precedent to another, to address new realities."). Both the
United States, A FRAMEwoRK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (visited July 2, 1997)
<http://wwww.whitehouse.gov/WHJCommerce/read.htm>, and the Council of Minsters of the
European Union, Conclusions of the Nov. 28 Telecommunications Council, THE REUTERS Eu-
ROPEAN CoMMUNrrY REPORT (Nov. 29, 1996), have expressed strong support for self-regula-
tion and encouraging private sector initiatives to develop procedures and policies that facilitate
operation of cyberspace.
206 SPEECHES OF OLIvER WENDELL HoLuis 102 (1934) quoted in NIMMER, supra note 5,
at § 1.02.
207 Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230,244 (1915), overruled by
Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
208 Greater Fremont, Inc. v. Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 663 (N.D. Ohio 1968), dffd sub
nom Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1970).
209 Lemley, supra note 104, at 314.
CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE
510 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
anticipating the economic and social impact of new technology.210 This
lack of foresight suggests that these institutions should not unnecessarily
exercise their existing authority and not seek new authority to regulate
cyberspace until either the technology and its implications become pre-
dictable or the institutions and customs of cyberspace have an opportu-
nity to develop in response to the needs of Cyberian constituent
communities and commerce. Accordingly, governments should en-
courage a self-regulation model.
A. SELF-HELP AND SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT MODELS
Two basic models of community regulation are a self-help model
and a social enforcement model.211 As in the "real world," self-help and
the social enforcement models are the core basis on which an efficient
ordering of cyberspace will be based. The self-help model allows the
individual to exit from situations in cyberspace that the individual finds
inappropriate. The social enforcement model allows individuals to form
communities in cyberspace that express their individual values and ex-
pectations and to exclude others who to do share those values or who are
unprepared or unwilling to comply with community norms.212
This article will consider each in turn and compare forms of rule-
making that are least restrictive, most decentralized, and cost effective to
those that are more centralized, restrictive, and cost inefficient. Through
this process, the article emerges at the third model - private law, self-
regulation, through a contract law paradigm which is best suited to gov-
ern cyberspace. The contract law model is most frequently offered as the
governing paradigm for cyberspace. 213 Contract law has much to com-
mend it. Contracts as a source of legitimacy and justification, for gov-
ernance has a long and honorable lineage.214 Contract at its best is the
expression of the free will of individuals freely acting to maximize their
personal welfare. 215
1. Unilateral Avoidance: The Self-Help Model
Probably, the simplest model of rule making, the most effective, and
the most cost-efficient is the self-enforcing one. The model is self-help
(i.e., "you don't like it, don't do it or stop people from doing it to
210 See Gordon & McKenzie, supra note 17, at 194-95.
211 See Perritt, supra note 36, at 354.
212 Perritt, supra note 25, at 1017-19 & n. 55 (citing GEORGE D. WEBSTER, THE LAW OF
AsSOCIATONS § 2.03(1) (b) (1993)). Both models suffer from one major defect, however,
neither controls individuals who are not part of the community.
213 See, e.g., Burnstein, supra note 163, at 97; Dunne, supra note 1, at 11-15; Johnson &
Marks, supra note 90, at 488-89; Perritt, supra note 36, at 355.
214 See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 33.
215 Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75, 85-86 (1984).
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you"). 216 If a denizen of cyberspace finds an area in cyberspace offen-
sive, he or she merely refuses to visit that location. The self-help model
is usually most effective when there are few or no externalities and the
transaction costs in negotiating a contract are high.217 The absence of
externalities ensures that the action is really unilateral; therefore, no third
party is either benefitted or harmed by the action, so the rights of third
parties do not need to be considered prior to taking the unilateral ac-
tion.218 In cyberspace, this model is particularly compelling.219 The
evolution of technology makes self-help rules a feasible option.
a. Spamming 220
One example of the self-enforcing model occurred on April 18,
1994, when thousands of Usenet users were faced with up to dozens of
messages from a law firm that was advertising how to get an Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service green card.221 Such a crass commerciali-
zation of cyberspace met almost universal disapproval. 222 The denizens
of cyberspace responded with letters, faxes, and E-mail. The volume of
E-mail was so great that it repeatedly crashed the law firm's Internet
service provider - promptly disconnecting, in fact, the firms account.223
The law firm dug in its heels, threatened to sue its ISP, and stated its
intention of continuing to advertise on the net.224 A Norwegian, Arnt
Gulbrandsen, created a cancelbot, a program that would automatically
delete every message that the firm tried to post on Usenet twenty seconds
after it was posted.225 This enforcement proved an elegant resolution to
216 Id. at 131 n.21. Self-help with some limitations is recognized in tort law. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 201 cmts. I-k (1965); U.C.C. § 9-503 (Unless otherwise
agreed, a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral, without
judicial process, if this can be done without a breach of the peace.).
217 Hardy, supra note 140, at 1017.
218 Id.
219 See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J.
1619, 1631-34 (1995).
220 Spam---"(From the Monty Python "Spam" song) to post irrelevant or inappropriate
messages to one or more Usenet newsgroups or mailing lists in deliberate or accidental
violation of netiquette.... Posting a message to a significant proportion of all newsgroups is a
sure way to spam Usenet and become an object of almost universal hatred." FOLDOC-FPRE
ON-LiNE DIcIoNARY OF COMPtrING (visited May 25, 1997) <http://wombat.doe.ic.ac.uk/
foldoc/index.html>.
221 STOLL, supra note 23, at 104. While the denizens of cyberspace have a strong cultural
aversion to advertising, they value information. Companies that want to advertise on the In-
ternet best do it by posting factual information regarding their products on the World Wide
Web where the information is only available to those looking for it.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 105.
225 Id.
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what appeared to be an intractable legal battle - the perfect solution to
unwanted advertising on the net. The cancelbot is effective against
"spamming" - the posting of a message on multiple Usenet news
groups or listserves that is not relevant to the purpose or topic of the list
or is commercial in nature.
b. Pornography
More recent examples of technology facilitating self-help remedies
are programs that allow parents226 or employers227 to control access to
the Internet: SurfWatch, Cybersitter, and Net Nanny. In the early 1990s,
the Internet shifted from being a primarily academic and research com-
munity to becoming a "family" network.228 As the number of children
increased, concern about the nature of the content available in cyber-
space increased, and the dangers of the Internet became a popular stalk-
ing horse of those who had never visited cyberspace. 229 In response to
the reasonable concerns of parents and teachers, software manufactures
created programs designed to permit parents and other adults to control
which Internet sites and facilities are accessible to children. 230
226 A major critique of screening technologies is that parents are uninterested, disinter-
ested, unwilling, or unable to utilize screening technology to protect their children from age
inappropriate content. See, e.g., Robert W. Peters, There is a Need to Regulate Indecency on
the Internet, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 363, 365-68 (1997) (citing a study that "at least
one in four parents were 'basically passive, preoccupied, and downright negligent."'). Yet,
"[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations that the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Reno v. ACLU, 1997 WL 348012 at *11 n.31 (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
227 Employers have an economic incentive to insure that work-time and employer owned
technology is used for "work purposes" only.
228 See Molly Ivins, Congress Goes After Sex on the Internet, SAN FRANcisco CHRON.,
Mar. 31, 1995, at A25 ("Until about 1990, the Internet was designed for adults only."); Elmer-
Dewitt, supra note 117, at 50 (originally the Internet linked government, educational institu-
tions, and corporations, and until 1993, it was difficult for an ordinary computer user to access
the Internet).
229 Steve Wildstrom & Toddi Gutner, Cybersmut: How to Lock out the Kids, Bus. WK,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 98.
230 See Kevin Reichard, Three Cybersmut Censors Try to Clean Up the Internet.
(SurfWatch Software's SurfWatch 1.Ov; Solid Oak Software's Cybersitter 1.2; Net Nanny Ltd's
Net Nanny 2.0) (First Looks) (Software Review) (Evaluation), PC MAG., Nov. 7, 1995, at 46;
Bruce Haring, Efforts to Police Internet, USA TODAY, June 14, 1995, at 1D. If all of these
arrangements sound ad hoc, it is because they have mostly sprung up in recent months in
response to parental concerns and political pressures. Wildstrom & Gutner, supra note 144, at
98.
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Cybersitter,23l Net Nanny,232 and SurfWatch 233 are a few of the
programs that block a PC user's access to offensive materials on the In-
ternet, including World-Wide Web and FTP sites, "alternative" new-
sgroups, IRC chat rooms, Gophers, and E-mail.234 Programs are sold to
concerned parents and employers, who do not want employees surfing
cyberspace during work hours.235 Some of these programs can also
monitor net access on commercial ISP providers such as America On-
Line, CompuServe, and Prodigy.236 "[A] foolproof filter list is impossi-
ble to develop because of the subjective nature of what is considered
objectionable, as well as the continually changing Internet. '237 The de-
signers of these programs, like Associate Justice Potter Stewart, simply
know it when they see it.238
Cybersitter is one of the most powerful of these products. 239 Cyber-
sitter blocks access to specific Internet resources (Web, FTP, and Usenet
Newsgroups) and censors specific search words. 240 Cybersitter contains
a large database of objectionable Internet sites.241 Because the content of
the Internet rapidly changes, Cybersitter allows a parent to log their
child's Internet usage and to add pecific sites to the database that the
parent wants to block.24 2
Net Nanny compares incoming and outgoing text against a diction-
ary of "banned words" that the parent creates and can also screen for
pornographic ,images.24 3 Net Nanny allows parents to customize their
own screening list for objectionable content (not limited to just pornogra-
231 Solid Oak Soffvare (last modified Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.solidoak.com/cysit-
ter.htm> [hereinafter Cybersitter].
232 NetNanny (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://www.netnanny.com> [hereinafter Net
Nanny].
233 SurfWatch (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://www.surfwatch.com> [hereinafter
SurfWatch].
234 The legal issues raised by these services" is beyond the scope of this article. For a
general discussion of the legal issues raised by rating services, see Volokh, supra note 35, at
429-434.
235 Id. From the employer's perspective this is similar to blocking access to "900" tele-
phone number.
236 Id.
237 Kathryn Munro, PC Magazine Online: Filtering Utilities (visited Apr. 24, 1997)
<http:lwww.pcmag.comlfeatures/utility/filterLopen.htm>.
238 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know
[pornography] when I see it.").
239 Editor's Choice, PC Magazine Online (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://
www.pcmag.comlfeatures/utility/filter/ufuec.htm>.
240 Jay Munro, PC Magazine Online: Cybersitter (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http:ll
www.pcmag.comlfeatures/utility/filter/ufu2.htm>.
241 Cybersitter, supra note 231.
242 Id.
243 Net Nanny, supra note 232, at <http://www.netnanny.com/nnfaq.html> (visited Apr.
24, 1997).
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phy)244 and to direct the software to log the activity or shut down the
computer (among other things).245 PC Magazine Online noted that
"[w]hen Net Nanny detects a listed violation, it can block access, moni-
tor hits, mask words, or shut down an application - all of which worked
well in our tests. '246 Net Nanny can also block images247 and will pro-
vide downloadable lists of specific sites identified by Net Nanny staff.248
SurfWatch monitors Internet activity by blocking access to objec-
tionable Web or FTP sites, IRC chat groups, newsgroups, or Gophers. 249
SurfWatch comes with a list of objectionable sites containing indecent
or pornographic materials and, for an additional fee, provides monthly
maintenance.250 If a child or employee attempts to access an "objection-
able site," SurfWatch denies access and displays a dialog box informing
the user.25 1
The Communications Decency Act criminalized knowingly trans-
mitting indecent materials using the Internet to individuals under the age
of 18.252 The statute provided a safe haven for individuals who "re-
quire[d] use of a verified credit card, . . .adult access code, or adult
personal identification number .... "253 To enable individual content
providers to take advantage of this safe haven, services such as Adult
Check, Adult Virtual System, First Virtual, Validate, or VeriSign began
to perform some sort of "adult verification. '254 Adult Check for example
allows individuals or organizations which are concerned that they may be
posting indecent material to verify that the viewer is over 18 years of age
(or at least that the viewer has access to an Adult Check ID number).2 55
One of the initial complaints regarding the CDA was that it imposed
financial burdens on the individual seeking to post questionable materials
on his or her web site.256 Adult Check charges the individuals seeking
access to the content and pays content providers through a referral sys-
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Kathryn Munro, PC Magazine Online: Net Nanny (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http:l
www.pcmag.com/features/utility/filter/ufu4.htm>.
247 Net Nanny, supra note 232, at <http:/www.netnanny.comlnnfaq.html> (visited Apr.
24, 1997).
248 Id.
249 Kathryn Munro, PC Magazine Online: SurfWatch (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http:Il
www.pcmag.com/features/utility/filter/ufu4.htm>.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1997).
253 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e) (5) (West Supp. 1997).
254 Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 933-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affirmed, 65 USLW 3323 (Jun. 27, 1997).
255 222 (visited Apr. 27, 1997) <http://www2.adultcheck.comlcgi-bin/
merchant.cgi?4803>.
256 Id.
CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE
tern. 257 The web site owner is paid a fee for each referral that leads to a
membership in Adult Check. 5 8 Even not-for-profits can use these sys-
tems.25 9 Again, this is an example of cyberspace technology permitting
self-help.
c. PICS
Finally, PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection) was devel-
oped by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's World Wide Web
Consortium. 260 PICS is an infrastructure for associating labels with In-
ternet content.26' PICS allows a parent to be sure that when his or her son
or daughter is visiting www.playboy.com or www.playgirl.com, he or
she is in actually only reading the articles. When a PICS code is embed-
ded into a document, a web browser can scan the document and either
display it or reject it depending on the PICS rating and the viewers pref-
erences without the viewer actually seeing the document. Web sites may
be rated as a whole or based on individual pages, or even parts of a page.
Although it communicates in a standard language, the individuals
rating the web sites do not necessarily share common values; rating serv-
ices create the common language. 262 In general, there are two types of
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 These programs do not meet the needs of organizations whose goal is to get their
message to the widest possible audience free of charge. Also it is not clear that the govern-
ment could limit access to these Internet sites only to adults who can prove they are "adults."
See Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States, 381 U.S. 301,305 (1965) (holding that
a statute requiring post office to detain and destroy foreign mail it considered to be communist
propaganda unless the addressee requested to receive the mail an unconstitutional limitation on
First Amendment rights). For reasons similar to the court's analysis Lamont,
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects
those who have sensitive positions. Their livelihood may be dependent on a security
clearance. Public officials like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they
would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the
seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in
sending for literature which federal officials have condemned as 'communist polit-
ical propaganda.'
Id. at 306. Individuals in cyberspace may forgo access to constitutionally protected content
rather than risk their family, friends, neighbors, or employers discovering membership in an
adult identification service, regardless of the nature of the content they choose to access.
260 Resnick, supra note 28, at 2.
261 <http://www.w3.prg/pubfWWW/PICS> (visited May 8, 1997). PICS has the potential
to do much more. PICS labels could be used for "code signing, privacy, and intellectual
property rights management." Id.
262 "User-based zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective, (i) an agreed-upon
code (or "tag") would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers with screening capabil-
ities would have to be able to recognize the "tag"; and (iii) those programs would have to be
widely available-and widely used by Internet users." Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 1997 WL 348012, *14 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting).
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rating services, third-party rating services and self-rating services. 263
CyberPatrol's CyberNOT list, EvaluWeb, and NetShepherd are examples
of third-party rating services. 264 A third-party rating service evaluates a
web site and rates it according that organization's standards of "good
taste. '265 Recreational Software Advisory Council (RSACi), Safe for
Kids, SafeSurf, and Vancouver Web Pages are examples of self-rating
services.2 66 For example, organizations like RSACi have developed on-
screen questionnaires to create a shared PICS vocabulary. 267 Individuals
may rate the web site, individual pages, or sections of a page based on
numerous categories. Viewers can tailor their viewing to Web sites that
meet certain preselected standards.
Of course, the viewer surrenders his or her content choices to a
trusted reviewer,268 and governments may mandate that each site be
rated and mandate the use of software to thwart access to sites that gov-
erning regime considers objectionable. 269
All of these software programs (and those still to come) will vary in
scope and effectiveness; 270 but the "first line of defense against Internet
porn - whether you want to protect children or office workers - should
be an instilled sense of personal responsibility, not reliance on software
that may or may not provide enough protection." 271 "A technological
solution to a social problem seldom works without a corresponding
change in the attitudes.1272 Still, these programs are excellent examples
263 <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS/raters.html> (visited May 8, 1997).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 RSACi FAQ Table of Contents (visited May 3, 1997) <http:llwww.rsac.org.faq.html>.
268 Cf Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1815-16
(1995) (discussing the role of reviewers in a world of information overload).
269 The author assumes that the next phase of "lobbying" will be to pressure rating serv-
ices to be more attuned to each constituency using the rating service or for each group con-
cerned with content to create their own rating service. The author wonders if this may become
a selling point, much like the words "Banned in Boston" assured a best seller in the 1960s,
e.g., some viewers may screen out low nudity, sex, violence, and adult language sites.
270 The contents of the Internet change faster than frequent updates can track, so the
programs supplement their bad-site list by watching for words or phrases in the names of sites
or newsgroups. This filtering function often produces curious results. All programs have
enough built-in intelligence to avoid the kind of absurdity that hit America Online last year
when it banned the word "breast" and cut off online discussions of breast cancer and chicken
breasts. See generally Wildstrom & Gutner, supra note 229, at 98.
271 Reichard, supra note 230, at 46; Personal Technology, Watching Out for the Kids,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at C1 (describing other products).
272 Nimmer, supra note 5, at 11.02[4]. At least on this point, the author is in agreement
with proponents of the CDA. See, e.g. Peters, supra note 226 at 366. "Yet, parental guidance
and control are needed to protect children. Technology is not the solution. Its just a tool. The
real answer is parenting: Understanding what your children are doing online, talking to them
about it, and guiding them." Id. (internal quotations, citations, and footnote omitted).
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of technology that permits self-help solutions in cyberspace with mini-
mal externalities, minimal cost, and no government involvement. 273
d. Disconnection Model
Finally, for disputes between ISPs or ISPs and customers, the dis-
connection enforcement model is an example of self-help in cyberspace.
The disconnection enforcement model has the following
components. The supplier of the network service unilat-
erally issues a statement declaring the terms of gov-
erning access. The statement primarily emphasizes
terms that protect the supplier and so it reserves the
power to cancel or modify the terms and obligates the
suppliers to little. Rather, the statement emphasizes the
[other party's] obligations and waives any implied or
preexisting... rights. 274
The disconnection enforcement model unplugs the offender.275 In the
case of an individual user, the disconnection is a vertical disconnection
from the host system.27 6 In case of an offending network, the disconnec-
tion is a horizontal disconnection from other networks - a denial of
internnectivity. 277
e. Intellectual Property
A core function of government is the protection of property. In
cyberspace, this is intellectual property. The economics of intellectual
property in cyberspace may be sufficiently different so that the protection
of intellectual property is unnecessary.278
[T]he profit-maximizing price on the Internet may be
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost because in-
tellectual property will be cross-subsidized by other
products in a manner sufficient to cover the fixed costs
273 Another example is Internet Fastforward by Primenet. Fastforward permits the user to
access world wide websites without viewing unwanted advertisements. Moreover, many users
of cyberspace consider tracking which websites they use for advertising or marketing purposes
to be an invasion of their privacy. Fastforward permits a user to delete information regarding
his or her visit to the website. Market Place (National Public Radio broadcast, May 8, 1996).
Also, listserves and newsgroups (not infrequently) debates and discussions break down
into acrimonious flaming. Members then have the option in a moderated list of seeking the
assistance of the moderator. If the moderator refuses to intervene or if the list is unmoderated,
the individual may join another list or newsgroup.
274 Perritt, supra note 36, at 356.
275 Id. at 355.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright
Law Could be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 23 (1997).
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associated with intellectual property creation and distri-
bution. If this is true, a market price of zero for intellec-
tual property can still create long-term economic profits
attributable to intellectual property creation. 279
Cross-subsidization could occur through advertising, sponsorships, sales
of upgrades, sales of complementary technology or physical goods, serv-
ices, or through "personal information collection and data mining.12 80 If
intellectual property is freely alienated then copyright or other protection
is superfluous.
But even if a strong regime of intellectual property remains the
dominant paradigm in cyberspace, there are self-help options.281 The
software manufacturer could limit technical support to registered
users.282 Authorization codes that would permit the software to function
for a limited time.283 Software envelopes that would contain the copy-
righted material and would communicate with the manufacturer on a pe-
riodic basis before permitting access. 284 Centralized software available
at one location on the net, and the user would pay a fee per use.285 These
intellectual property self-help options are not science fiction. Many of
them are already available commericially. 2 86 With a judicious use of
technology and ethical socialization, intellectual property can be pro-
tected in cyberspace without resort to government.
2. Social Control Model (Reputational Sanctions)
The social control model assumes a voluntary association of In-
ternet users setting rules through social norms or multiparty agreements.
The paradigm of social control uses rewards and punishments. Pro-so-
cial behavior is rewarded; ordinary social behavior is treated neutrally;
and antisocial behavior is punished.28 7 Professor Ellickson describes "a
system of social control... [that] consist[s] of rules of normatively ap-
279 Id.
280 Id. at 22-27; Dyson, supra note 32, at 141 ("The real value created by most software
companies lies in thier distribution networks, trained user bases, and brand names-not in their
code."); see also Chon, supra note 30, at, 272-76.
281 Id. at 38-48 (discussing alternative "self-help" copyright regimes based on technology
or contract).
282 Eric Schlachter, Intellectual Property Protection Regimes in the Ages of the Internet
(visited Apr. 30, 1997) <http:/Iblake.oit.unc.edu/copyrightl.html>.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 See, e.g., id. at nn.85 & 87 (providing the URLs for companies producing some of
these products).
287 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDaR Wrrmour LAW 124 (1991) (Table 7.1). An example of
this system in the employment context is when an extraordinary employee receives a bonus;
the ordinary employee receives only his or her expected salary; and the under-performing
employee is fired.
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propriate human behavior. These rules are enforced through sanctions,
the administration of which is itself governed by rules. '288 There are
five "controllers" of punishment and rewards. 28 9 "The five consist of
one first-party controller, one second-party controller, and three third-
party controllers." 290 A person who imposes rules and sanctions on him-
self is exercising first-person control.291 First-person control is "personal
ethics. '292 Second-party controllers are contracts. 293 The three types of
third-party controllers are social forces (norms), organizations (organiza-
tional rules), and governments (law).294 Voluntary or private associa-
tions are created, exist through rules, and tend to be self-governing. 295
These rules may be formal, written rules, or rules based on custom
passed on to new members through oral tradition and actual practice.296
Under the social enforcement model, the "controller is the group as a
whole, rather than the state, an individual, or an organization. '297 This
section will focus on governing cyberspace through informal social
norms, for this model is the most decentralized and democratic.
Some critics may argue that this is not real law;298 at best it is vol-
untary compliance with some vacuous community norm. Yet, contract
law scholars have long discovered that compliance with contract terms in
the business community is relatively unaffected by the ultimate legal en-
forceabilty of the contract.299 Business relationships create sanctions.
Business people who depart from the accepted norms of behavior in their
peer group risk losing business opportunities or status in their commu-
nity.300 Finally, we know from extensive study of black markets and
288 Id. at 124.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 126.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 127.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 127.
295 Id.
296 In cyberspace, dissemination of rules is done throughfrequently asked questions, neti-
quette, and flames.
297 Komhauser, supra note 150, at 651.
298 See Perritt, supra note 36, at 1022 & n.67.
299 See STEWART MACAULAY Er. AL, CorNRAcrs N ACrnON 413 (1995).
300 See id. at 414. Professor Macaulay recounts an historical example in Essex County,
Massachusetts between 1629 and 1692. Allegations of exceeding the just price were serious
charges that could harm a merchant whether he was guilty or not. So merchants who heard
rumors regarding their integrity would immediately sue for defamation to vindicate their repu-
tations in the community. See iL at 573 (quoting KoNiG, LAW AND SocIETY rN PuRIrAN
MAssACHUswrrs: EssEx CouNrY, 1629-1892). See also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of
Groups: The Influence of Legal and Non-Legal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CI. L.
Rav. 133 (1996).
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criminal enterprises that private governments are quite able to enforce
community sanctions. 30'
The social enforcement model uses the social constraint of a cohe-
sive community whose penalties range from truthful negative gossip to
excommunication from the community. 302 Cyberspace has been largely
governed by an informal set of norms that are enforced through social
control.30 3 Experienced users inculcated Cyberian values into new-com-
ers.304 The responses to a breach of "netiquette" range from polite re-
proof to major flames. The communication is the defining characteristic
of cyberspace. So, cyberspace is uniquely suited to governance using
social or reputational sanctions. A reputational sanction may be commu-
nicated throughout cyberspace in moments.305 But the anonymous aper-
sonal nature of cyberspace attenuated the effects of such sanctions. In
cyberspace, because of anonymous postings and problems of authentica-
tion, the reader has no way to determine the credibility of the individual
administering the administrative sanction. Further, the recipient of a
reputational sanction may just change his name and continue to carry-on
so experiencing little or no effect of the sanction. Although the cohesive-
ness of the Cyberian community has been questioned by some, this abil-
ity to create rules and administer sanctions is the basis for self-regulation
in cyberspace.
This model, then, exemplifies the preconditions necessary to estab-
lish an effective voluntary association - that is, a voluntary association
that can self-govern and self-enforce without resorting to outside en-
forcement mechanisms. 30 6 Game theory explains why multidimensional
relationships are necessary to effectively govern through social norms. 30 7
The Prisoner's Dilemma demonstrates the basic principles involved.30 8
301 See MACAULAY, supra note 299, at 413.
302 See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 287.
303 Lemley, supra note 104, at 312.
304 Seniority and authority in cyberspace tends to be based on-line experience or individ-
ual merit rather than chronological age. Cf. Suzanne P. Weisband, et al., Computer-Mediated
Communication and Social Information: Status Salience and Status Differences, 38 ACADEMY
OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1124, 1124 (1995) ("Many studies have found that groups that
interact by computer-mediated communication ... technologies are less prone to domination
by high-status members than are face-to-face groups."). The Missouri adage "show me" is
frequently the motto in a community where anyone can aspire to claim to be anyone or any-
thing. Also, traditional hierarchies break down when access is essentially equal. Lemley,
supra note 104, at 312.
305 For a fascinating account of the theoretical effect of reputational sanctions in a liberta-
rian community, see Dmitry N. Feofanov, Luna Law: The Libertarian Vision in Heinlein's the
Moon is A Harsh Mistress, 63 TENN. L. Rv. 71, 81 (1995) ("'If a man's word isn't any good,
who would contract with him?... [P]eople won't speak to you, buy from you, sell to you.').
306 Perritt, supra note 36, at 360.
307 Kornhauser, supra note 150, at 659, 663.
308 Id. The basic model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that two individuals are arrested.
The government has sufficient evidence to convict both of them of a misdemeanor, but needs
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In this game, each player is given two choices: "cooperate" or "de-
fect." 309 In a one shot game, a rational player will maximize the player's
welfare by defecting. But players in a continuing game who do not know
which "turn" will be the last maximize their individual welfare by coop-
erating. 310 Multidimensional relationships also assume that there are no
gross conflicts between the players - all players are similar situated.
Further multidimensional relationships help ensure that the game remains
in Nash equilibrium so that no player can unilaterally improve the pay-
off. Professor Ellickson assumes that a defection by player JP in a game
between JP and LaFond may be sanctioned in the next round when
player JP faces player Durkee. Durkee, aware of JP's defection, will
adopt a defection/defection strategy to minimize loss. 311 The enforce-
ment is social because the tit for tat strategy is enforced by the commu-
nity of players rather than the innocent victim. 312 The more dimensions
of interaction between players, the less likely a player can create a strat-
egy that will result in a unilateral playoff (defection) without a corre-
sponding off-set on another level.
There is some question about the extent to which individuals estab-
lish continuing relationships in cyberspace. 313 Howard Rheingold de-
scribes vibrant communities in cyberspace.314 Denizens of cyberspace
may have continuing relationships in cyberspace communities. Commu-
nities are not just electronically mediated, but in times of crisis or need
extend into the "real world." Many CMC communities are laden with
back-channel communication. In addition to the exchange on e-mail or
messages that is visible to all users, there may be a private exchanges of
the assistance of the other prisoner to convict either prisoner of a felony. Each prisoner is
interrogated separately and offered a reduced sentence if the prisoner testifies. If one prisoner
refuses to testify and the other prisoner testifies, then the prisoner who refuses to testify gets a
correspondingly more severe sentence. See id. at 659 n.62.
309 Cooperate in this situation means comply with the social norm. Defect means deviate
from the social norm. See Kornhauser, supra note 150, at 663 n.62.
310 Id. at 660 n.67; EL.icKsoN, supra note 287, at 164-66.
311 Komhauser, supra note 150, at 665-67.
312 This model requires some awareness of reputation; see id. Therefore, it seems particu-
larly apt for cyberspace, where information about a user s reputation can be disseminated
virtually instantly.
313 Perritt, supra note 36, at 360; but see Malcolm R. Parks & Floyd Kory, Making
Friends in Cyberspace, 46 J. Comm. 80 (1996) (Sixty percent of the participants in a study
reported that they has formed personal relationships with individuals they first contacted
through a newsgroup.); Jacobson, supra note 119, at 467;Wellman, supra note 26, at 220-22.
314 Perritt, supra note 36, at 360. Howard Rheingold describes the Well as a thriving on-
line community with multidimensional relationships. RHEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 17-38. Vir-
tual relations may be stronger and more vibrant than "real ones." There are numerous exam-
ples of individuals meeting on line and later marrying.
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electronic messages, telephone conversations, or even in person meetings
to supplement the communication that is visable to the community.31 5
Many Cyberians are tourists; they enter and leave Cyberian commu-
nities without any connection to members of that community. The one
dimensional nature of some Cyberians' experiences attenuates the effect
of social disapproval as a sanction in cyberspace.316 But more and more
tourists are becoming residents. A violator of the rules of a self-gov-
erning cyberspace community who is "excommunicated" from the com-
munity can locate a new community and create a new identity there.
Moreover, considering the relative anonymity in cyberspace, the violator
may even rejoin the original community under a new identity.317 In
either case, it takes time and effort to make new friends and to become
accepted in the new community-and even there, sometimes one's repu-
tation will follow. Also, many Cyberians develop long term personal
relationships in cyberspace that extend to the real world. Anti-social acts
in cyberspace can effect real world social interaction.
An example of a virtual crime, trial, and adjudication took place on
a MOO. 318 In March 1993, a virtual personality Mr. Bungle used a
software tool commonly called a voodoo doll 319 to virtually rape an-
other virtual personality Legba. Later that evening, he also virtually
raped another virtual personality Starsinger.320 The virtual rape took
place in a virtual community of LambdaMOO. 32 1 Mr. Bungle forced two
virtual personalities to service him "in a variety of more of less conven-
tional ways. '' 322 Usually, MOOs and MUDs have superusers called wiz-
ards that resolve disputes among the participants. On LambdaMOO,
however, the wizards devolved the power of settling disputes to the par-
ticipants and restricted themselves to the technical hardware and
software problems of supporting a MOO. 323 The community was faced
with three choices; (1) the legalists argued that nothing could be done
because virtual rape was not against the rules in the community; (2) the
royalists argued for the return of the wizardocracy; and (3) the
315 For example, the author is a member of several electronic conferences for lawyers and
law professors. In addition to sharing information in the electronic conferences, members send
private e-mail, telephone calls, meet at conferences and symposia, and share common real life
friends. The relationships one develops and shares in these electronic conferences is as com-
plex and multideminsional as "real life" relationships.
316 Perritt, supra note 36, at 360.
317 Dibbell, supra note 107, at 486. In the LambdaMOO incident, community members
quickly discovered the "true identity" of the new cybercommunity member. See id. at 477.
318 Id.
319 A "voodoo doll" is a program that attributes to others actions that the users did not
actually write. See id. at 475.
320 Id. at 473.
321 Id. at 474.
322 Id. at 473.
323 Id. at 479.
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technolibertarians argued that the only response was for the individuals
who were offended to block the offending messages. 324 However per-
suasive that argument may be in the normal run of circumstances, here
the command would only prevent the virtual victims from experiencing
their own cyber-rape while the other members of the community were
free to witness the event.325 While perhaps not a consensus, the Lamb-
daMOO community resolved things after long debate by "toading" Mr.
Bungles:326 eliminating his character from the virtual community.327
In response to the Mr. Bungles incident, the wizards put into place a
system of petitions and ballots where any member of the LambdaMOO
community could put any issue to popular vote and the decision of the
community would bind the wizards. 328 Mr. Bungles later tried to return
to LamdaMOO as Dr. Jest. However, he faced social ostracism and fi-
nally departed permanently from LambdaMOO. 329 This is a clear exam-
ple of a Cybercommunity creating its own laws, adjudicating a violation
of those laws, and punishing violations-acting as a community.
3. Penology of Cyberspace
Individuals can be punished in cyberspace through jail,33° social os-
tracism, removal from the relevant Cyberian community, and ultimately
disconnected from the system by their ISP.331 After the Cyberian pun-
ishment has been inflicted, the individual may still be punished in the
.real world through the law of the jurisdiction where the user may be
found. A study of the "penology" of cyberspace is beyond the scope of
this article. Without resort to institutions outside of cyberspace, there are
numerous mechanisms to sanction the violation of those rules. Nonethe-
less, the sanctions discussed so far appear to be effective in meeting all
of the three principles that are generally used to justify punishment: pro-
tection, deterrence, and retribution.
B. CoNTRACrING FOR GOVERNANCE IN CYBERSPACE
In theory, the contract basis for governing cyberspace would result
in a seamlegs web of contractual rights, duties, and enforcement mecha-
324 Id. at 479.
325 Id. at 480.
326 Id. at 485.
327 Id. at 478.
328 Id. at 485.
329 Id. at 488.
330 For example on a MUD/MOO, a wizard may take an offending user aside and suspend
that person's access to the community while engaging in remedial social instruction. These
individuals are often taken to an area in the MUD/MOO called "jail." While in jail, the of-
fender has no social interaction within anyone but wizards.
331 As digital cash becomes more prevalent, fines may become more feasible.
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nisms that would bind and build the community and avoid the difficult
issues of jurisdiction, international law, comity, and sovereignty. 332
Each user would have a contract with that user's ISP.333 The ISPs would
then have contracts with each other that govern their relationships and
the relationships of the ISP's users.334 For example, user JP, who ac-
cesses the Internet through ANET, has a disagreement with user LaFond,
who accesses the Internet through BNET. JP and LaFond have no con-
tract or formal relationship to resolve their dispute. They will find that
when they joined ANET and BNET, respectively, they agreed to contrac-
tual provisions that will govern disputes in cyberspace. ANET and BNET
have a contract that governs disputes between their respective members.
The contract between ANET and BNET may not be directly between them-
selves, but rather between them as members of an ISP trade association
or as common users of a telecommunications company that provides net
access.
If the contracts entered into are truly negotiated and represent a
meeting of the minds - or, at least, an agreement of the electronic
agents - then cyberspace should be governed under the rubric of con-
tract. Individuals should be required to honor agreements they freely
entered into. But if the contracts are standard form contracts to which
Cyberians will unknowingly assent and waive valuable rights in ex-
change for access, the potential for abuse is too great. "Speech is regu-
lated ... under terms of contract that people agree to when they again
access to the Internet through [ISPs]."335 "By first making the contract
then by declaring who should construe it, the strong could oppress the
weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to secure the enforcement of
contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy. '336
Another criticism the contract law approach is that it protects only
the contracting parties and those in privity with them. A contract based
law of cyberspace could provide third parties with the option of seeking
protection under the law and adjudication procedures of cyberspace, but
332 See Dunne, supra note 1, at 10-13; Perritt, supra note 29, at 25 ("Purely private con-
tact can achieve some immunity from outside legal institutions by waiving application of ex-
ternal law and recourse to external legal systems.").
333 Many users already enter cyberspace through private networks or ISPs, for example
America On-Line (AOL), CompuServe, Prodigy, the Well, through colleges, universities, or
research institutions with acceptable use policies, and through employers with policies that
govern behavior in cyberspace while using employer supplied access. See Hardy, supra note
140, at 1029-30.
334 Imagine the paradigm of major league baseball that is brought to cyberspace without
the all-powerful commissioner. The relationships of owners, managers, players, and umpires
are all governed by a web of contracts-even the rules of baseball are a function of contract.
335 Peters, supra note 226, at 370 n.58 (quoting David Cay Johnston, The Fine Print of
Cyberspace, N.Y. TiM s, Aug. 11, 1996, sec. 4, at 5).
336 Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696, 697 (Ga. 1904).
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it could not force a non-Cyberian to forgo other remedies. Assuming
that there is no strong advantage to forum shopping, third-parties will
generally find Cyberian adjudication faster and cheaper than resorting to
their local courts, where they will face perplexing questions about juris-
diction, venue, and choice of law. This section argues for contract law as
the governing paradigm, but urges Cyberians not to shrinkwrap the social
contract in cyberspace.
1. Contracting for a New Social Contract
The law of cyberspace may be established in the marketplace and
may reflect the will of the participants. Some cyberspace activities may
price themselves out of the market.337 Proponents of the contract model
assume that, because of the decentralized nature of the Internet, there
will be numerous Internet service providers and the user will always be
free to change ISPs. 338 Arguably, the ISP must set competitive terms in
order to compete in a competitive market place.339 Individuals who wish
to engage in high risk behavior (for example, potential cybertorts) will
join an ISP which will charge more to cover the additional risk. But
almost everyone will be able to find an ISP contract with terms that per-
mits him or her the level of access he or she desires. Once a critical mass
of ISPs require these standard terms as part of their user contracts or
acceptable use policies, other ISPs will follow out of fear that networks
that adopt these rules will limit access from non-conforming sites.340
The individual user will have a contract with his or her ISP; the ISP will
have contracts with other ISPs and networks; 341 the networks may con-
tract among themselves. Once the web of contracts are in place, users,
ISPs, ISOC, content providers, telcos, and other players have created and
assented to the jurisdiction of cyberspace. Finally, the ISPs will act as a
337 The market price for some speech or activities may be so high that most market par-
ticipants may not have an opportunity to purchase the-right "to speak" or to engage in these
activities. While this drawback would be a marked departure from cyberspace as we currently
know it, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 830, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996), it is not so different from
life outside of cyberspace. Just as there are illegal radio stations, one may assume that there
may be black or gray-market ISPs to provide access.
338 This flexibility, of course, does not apply to students, employees, or others whose
Internet access is conditioned on the use of a particular ISP or whose access to the ISP is based
on a "status" such as student or employee.
339 Perritt, supra note 36, at 357; Johnson & Marks, supra note 144, at 509.
340 Dunne, supra note 1, at 13-15.
341 Burnstein, supra note 163, at 100:
For example, AOL and CompuServe might require forum selection clauses in all
users' service contracts. In turn, AOL and CompuServe would contract to the effect
that disputes arising between an AOL user and a CompuServe user would be gov-
erned by a particular forum's law. Following this method, an association of access
providers could work in unison to bring much needed certainty to the choice of law
issues that will face their users when disputes arise among them.
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private legislature that selects through the contract process dispute reso-
lution procedures and provides which forum's laws shall govern the in-
terpretation and enforcement of the contract. This process, therefore,
negates thorny national and international jurisdiction and choice of law
issues.342
2. Legitimizing a Contract Based Law of Cyberspace
This market ideal in keeping with the Western democratic goal is to
guarantee each person the greatest possible autonomy compatible with
equal autonomy for all and the minimum degree of social cooperation
that is absolutely necessary to insure society's survival. 343 Such an ideal
is in keeping with the origins of cyberspace and the norms and traditions
passed on by the first settlers. 344 Professor Dunne describes the original
pioneers in cyberspace as "'tend[ing] to be [an] independent, laissez-
faire bunch. They put a great store in individualism .... , ,345 "Behavior
in cyberspace has traditionally been based on a common understanding
among its inhabitants about what is acceptable. The Cyberian ethic has
been not so much that access to computers should be unlimited and total
and that all information should be free, but that this should be so to the
extent possible without harming individuals or damaging their prop-
erty. ' 3 4 6 Accordingly, the contract model of assuring each person the
greatest possible autonomy compatible with equal autonomy for all and
the minimum degree of social cooperation that is absolutely necessary to
insure society's survival fits into the existing cultural norms of
cyberspace. 347
C. SHRINKWRAPPING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Not all contracts are open covenants that are openly arrived at. The
"shrinkwrap contract" is not unique to cyberspace.348 The concern with
342 Dunne, supra note 1, at 9-13. The possible violations of Antitrust law are outside the
scope of this article. Suffice it to say, domestic and foreign antitrust regulation must be con-
sidered in establishing uniform contracts for cyberspace. See, e.g., Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) (holding that a requirement that all disputes be-
tween motion picture producers and theater owners be arbitrated violated section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
343 See Rosenfeld, supra note 33, at 772-73; MACAULAY Er AL., supra note 299, at 19.
344 Dunne, supra note 1, at 10.
345 Id. at 10 (citing Dorothy Denning, Concerning Hackers Who Break Into Computer
Systems (1990) (paper presented at the 13th National Computer Security Conference, Wash-
ington, D.C. Oct. 1-4, 1990)); Burton, supra note 2, at 35.
346 Dunne, supra note 1, at 10-11.
347 Id. at 11 ("Contract's traditional reliance on agreement by the individuals to be bound
retains the element of individual responsibility that is an integral part of Cyberian culture.").
348 A shrinkwrap license (contract) is a form of contract that software vendors often try to
impose unilaterally on "purchasers" of mass market software. The "purchaser" of the software
theoretically "consents" to the terms of the license by opening the plastic wrapping on the
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using an authoritarian contract model was first expressed by Professor
Friedrich Kessler in 1943:
Freedom of Contract enables enterprisers to legislate by
contract and, what is even more important, to legislate in
a substantially authoritarian manner without using the
appearance of authoritarian forms. Standard contracts in
particular could thus become effective instruments in the
hands of powerful .industrial and commercial overlords
enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own
making upon a vast host of vassals.349
The standard form contact is pervasive in modem commercial prac-
tices,350 and has been a common commercial practice for at least the past
100 years.35' Since the late 1980s, the shrinkwrap or boxtop license has
been the license model used for software contracts. 352 Standard form
contracts are a result of the hierarchical structure of business organiza-
tions and the need to engage in mass volume contracting. 353 Standard
software (e.g., the shrinkwrap packaging). Lemley, supra note 104, at 311 n.5. The contract is
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
349 Friedreich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts about Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 640 (1943). Professor Black observed that:
The contract law system... serves massively and systematically as an intensifier of
economic advantage and disadvantage. It does this because people and businesses
who are in strong bargaining positions, or who can afford expensive legal advice,
can and epidemically do exact of necessitous and ignorant people contractual en-
gagements which the general law never would impose.
Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79 YALE L.J. 505, 508
(1970) (emphasis in original). As the contract model is being considered as a basis for law in
cyberspace, one should also remember that it was one of the legal underpinnings of feudalism.
350 Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thurmann, A New and Old Theory for Adjudicating
Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323-24, 334 (1987).
351 Id. at 325-26. See also W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 21, 31 (1984).
352 Until ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), it was generally ac-
cepted that shrinkwrap licenses were not enforceable. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70
(5th Cir. 1988); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz.
1993); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. Rlv.
1239, 1263 & n.107 (1995); but see Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief
Defense of Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RuTGERS COMPuTER & TECH. L.J.
335 (1996). The Seventh Circuit's opinion in ProCD, revived the debate. Regardless of
whether shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable under existing law, they will be enforceable in the
states that adopt proposed Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g. §§ 2B-307-
309.
353 Holmes & Thurmann, supra note 350, at 334.
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form contracts allow "numerous, relatively detailed contract[s], ' 35 4 re-
duce transaction costs, 355 and "assure uniformity and quality. 35 6
The shrinkwrap model assumes that the Internet service provider
unilaterally establishes rules for use and access, methods of adjudication,
and enforcement. 357 The ISP unilaterally, without negotiation, and with-
out considering the rights of the user, offers terms which protect the
ISP.358 Further, the ISPs reserve the right to unilaterally modify the
terms in the future and contain de minimis obligations to the user.35 9
The user need not be aware of the changes in the terms. For example,
the ISP could announce during the log-on process that there are new
changes to the terms of service, and if the user would like the read them,
the user could access a special file. If the user does not object within
some specific period, the user automatically "agrees" to the new terms.
The disadvantage is that such rules are made secretly and presented
to the user on a take-it or leave-it basis.3 60 Each institution involved in
providing Internet services to the public faces similar economic, polit-
ical, and legal constraints. As rational profit-maximizing institutions,
they will draft contracts that maximize their legal rights, minimize their
legal obligations, and whenever possible, shift their potential liability.361
"If a standard form contract clause's validity should be chal-
lenged.., and held unenforceable, the ISP suffers nothing. Similarly the
ISP is no worse off than if the unenforceable clause had not been in the
contract in the first place (and of course, might be much better off if the
interim effect of the clause staved off other individuals' legal claims). 362
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id. Uniformity and quality is assured because the customer is not permitted to dicker
for different terms and employees of the seller are (or should be) aware of the obligations of
their employer.
357 Perritt, supra note 36, at 354. ISPs are the point of entry for all denizens in cyber-
space. Thus, they are the most logical points to govern cyberspace. Professor Perritt notes
that host-based electronic networks already use the authoritarian model. Id. at 354 n.13. For
example, commercial information services provide written contracts that are supplemented by
notices which appear on user screens. See id. Generally, the user accepts or rejects the supple-
mental terms by typing the "y" key (yes) or "n" key (no). See id. See also Johnson & Marks,
supra note 144, at 488-89.
358 Perritt, supra note 36, at 356.
359 Id.
360 This article assumes that technology will be unable to compensate for the potential
evils of the shrinkwrap license.
361 Lawyers tend to draft standard form contracts to the "edge of the possible," i.e., the
maximum latitude allowed by law, in order to protect a client from every imaginable contin-
gency. William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: A Model
Rule that Should Have Been, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETics 799, 827 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. Rv. 1172, 1222, & 1244
(1984).
362 Vukowich, supra note 361, at 828.
1997] -CYBERSPACE GOVERNANCE
Because these institutions provide Internet services in a common regula-
tory and economic environment, the contracts will be substantially simi-
lar and agreements between these institutions will ultimately shift
liability to the individual user.363
In essence, this process creates a collective private legislature.364
However, no one elected the members of this legislature; it is not ac-
countable to anyone, and there are no ways to amend the legislation.365
The proponents of the contract law model presume an open marketplace
that is replete with savvy, sophisticated consumers who will vote with
their feet when the terms and conditions of the contract are too oner-
ous.3 66 Thus, open market forces will keep the ISP or content provider's
unilateral contracts from being too draconian.367 This view of the market
does not reflect existing experience in other market contexts.3 68 There
may be significant transaction costs in researching and changing to alter-
native ISPs. 369 "If access requires using a commercial service, and if all
commercial services use the same shrinkwrap license, the result is a
world that gives 'freedom of contract' to [ISPs] (who wrote the con-
363 Compare the collection of ISP Acceptable Use Policies collected at <http:ll
spam.abuse.net/spam/aup.html> (visited June 4, 1997).
364 Lemley, supra note 104, at 319.
365 Id. at 320.
366 Johnson & Marks, supra note 144, at 488-89. For example, United States courts have
rejected this argument in the antitrust context:
[Tihere likely will be some large volume, sophisticated purchasers who will under-
take the comparative studies and insist, in return for their patronage, that Kodak
charge them competitive lifecycle prices. Kodak contends that these knowledgeable
customers will hold down the package price for all other customers. There are rea-
sons, however, to doubt that sophisticated purchasers will ensure that competitive
prices are charged to unsophisticated purchasers, too. As an initial matter, if the
number of sophisticated customers is relatively small, the amount of profits to be
gained by supra competitive pricing in the service market could make it profitable to
let the knowledgeable consumers take their business elsewhere. More importantly,
if a company is able to price discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated
consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to prevent the exploitation of the
uninformed.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 475 (1992).
367 But see Rakoff, supra note 361, at 1220-29 (explaining why standard form contracting
is not responsive to market forces).
368 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95, 123-24 n.74 (1974); cf. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at
472-75.
369 Perritt, supra note 36, at 357; Gerard J. Lewis, Jr., Comment, Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l: Broad Copyright Protection for User Interfaces Ignores the
Softvare Industry's Trend Toward Standardization, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 689, 693 n.1 1 (1991)
("Training people to use software prograls is the largest investment associated with operating
computers."). Cf. Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 474-75 ("[E]ven if consumers were capa-
ble of acquiring... [the] information, they may choose not to do so. Acquiring the informa-
tion is expensive. If the costs of service are small.. ., or if consumers are more concerned
about equipment capabilities than service costs, they may not find it cost efficient to compile
the information.").
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tracts), but none to... users. '370 Freedom to change ISPs may be illu-
sory.371 Users may make substantial investments in hardware and
software that may only be compatible with one service provider, and
high transaction costs such as obtaining information, negotiation, and re-
ducing the negotiations to an agreement often render a contract based
solution economically irrational.372
The nature of cyberspace makes it possible to reject traditional prin-
ciples of standard form contracts in favor of contracts which are freely
bargained for and to which the parties freely agree. The major advantage
of the standard form contract is that of reduced transaction costs. While
this may be an advantage in the real world, cyberspace technology al-
ready is reducing transaction costs. For example, the string of email
messages exchanged as part of the information and negotiation process
also contain the terms of the agreement. 373 Further, the drafts of pro-
posed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code provide for an "elec-
tronic agent. '374 An electronic agent is "a computer program designed,
selected, or programmed by a party to initiate or respond to electronic
messages.., without review [by] an individual. '375 Article 2B provides
that electronic agents may form contracts,376 make offers, and accept
terms.377 Transaction costs for contracts in cyberspace may be reduced
to sending out a "bot" or a "spider" to search the Internet, make offers,
and seek acceptances. 378 Accordingly, the one-size fits all contract
should be rejected because it is ill-fitted to cyberspace.
D. JUSTICE THROUGH CONTRACT
A community that lacks a "practical agreement on a conception of
justice must also lack the necessary basis for political community. '379
Cyberspace is inhabited by representatives of numerous nations and cul-
370 Lemley, supra note 104, at 320. Critical Legal Studies scholars observe:
[O]rganizations that engage in repeated standardized transactions can plan these rela-
tionships to their advantage.... Most individuals are not aware of what they are
giving away when they sign. If they were, they would have what one taking the
radical position would call little real choice but to sign away their rights.
MACAULAY ET. AL, supra note 299, at 11.
371 Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 472-75.
372 Hardy, supra note 140, at 1017.
373 See Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38
VILL. L. REv. 403 (1993).
374 U.C.C. § 2B-102(13) (1996) (draft).
375 Id.
376 Id. § 2B-202(a).
377 Id. § 2B-204(c).
378 For examples of "existing" electronic agents, see Netbot <http://www.netbot.com>
and BargainFinder Agent <http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf>.
379 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, reprinted in WHAT IS JUSTICE? CLASSIC AND CON-
TEMPORARY READINcS 322 (Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy eds., 1990).
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tures, each with its own definition of justice. Contract permits each com-
munity in cyberspace to define its own concept of justice. Therefore, the
convergence between law, justice, and contract is also relevant in the
context of private law-making or legislation between individuals (i.e. pri-
vate contracts). 380 In a society which promotes individual autonomy,
justice may be defined as keeping one's agreements - in essence, con-
tract as justice.381 This approach to defining social norms of behavior is
that justice is accomplished without any authority imposing its view of
social good on unwilling individuals.382 In a society which operationally
defines justice as a function of contract, no one may force his or her
views on others. Nor can anyone be compelled to do anything that he or
she has not previously agreed to do.383 Therefore, the only just institu-
tions are those that are agreed upon by each member of society. 384
But, the justice of private contracts is raised each time there is a
dispute concerning whether society should enforce the contract or pro-
vide a remedy for its breach.385 The justice of a contract between two
individuals exists either because the parties reached a genuine agreement
or because of the actual terms of their agreement are just.38 6 If the par-
ties have reached a meeting of the minds, the contract is intrinsically just
because it expresses the will of both parties; therefore, the greatest possi-
ble freedom of contract is permitted.387 The justification of contract law
is that contracts are intrinsically just and not premised on any particular
vision of what is moral or immoral.388 The justice of a contract depends,
on reaching a genuine agreement (i.e., the meeting of the minds or the
actual terms of the agreement). 38 9 Arguendo, when the consumer is
presented with a take it or leave it shrinkwrapped standard form contract,
there is no meeting of the minds. Further, consumers may be forced to
agree to unconscionable terms under duress as access to cyberspace be-
380 Id.
381 Rosenfeld, supra note 33, at 771 (citing J. LUCAS, ON JUsTIcE 208 (1980)). "We are
told that Contract, like God, is dead." GRANT GiLMoRE, THE DAmH OF CoNRAcr 3 (1974).
But the more appropriate quote in this context may be "God is dead - Nietzsche Nietzsche is
dead-God" or the "King is dead, Long Live the King" in this context. As Professor Gilmore
was delivering a series of lectures announcing the death of contract, GnmoRE, supra, at ix,
Professor Rawls was enshrining contract as the definition of justice, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971). Contract was never able to rest in peace.
382 Rosenfeld, supra note 33, at 771.
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Id. Promisees can enforce contracts without the assistance of the state. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Per-
formiance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). See also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 4
HArsv. L. Rnv. 553, 571-85 (1933) (discussing justifications for contract law).
386 Rosenfeld, supra note 33, at 771-72.
387 Id.
388 I&
389 See infra Part VI.B.
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comes a necessity rather than a luxury. Because there will not be a genu-
ine agreement, the justice of the contract will have to be evaluated based
on the intrinsic terms of the agreement. 390 Two options are readily possi-
ble: (1) case-by-case adjudication of the terms of each contract under
traditional principles of contract law;39 1 or (2) some regulatory agency
that reviews these contacts as tariffs - a paradigm similar to the public
regulatory model.392 Since the purpose of self-regulation is to avoid for-
mal governmental structures, issues of fairness should be submitted to
arbitration.
VII. ADJUDICATION IN CYBERSPACE-PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
"COURTS OF JUSTICE"
After a law of cyberspace is established, disputes will arise that
must be adjudicated. Two traditional sources of adjudication are the
public courts of a nation and private courts created by contract. Ques-
tions regarding choice of law, forum, venue, and jurisdiction render the
public law courts inefficient in cyberspace. The contract law model pro-
vides a simple solution for resolving disputes in cyberspace-arbitra-
tion. Unlike private courts, "government" courts are obligated to apply
the law of the nation state.393 This includes national choice of law
rules.394 "According to the traditional and still prevailing view, these
conflict of law rules restrict the choice of the law(s) application to inter-
national contracts to the law(s) of (a) State(s), to the exclusion of any
supra-national or a-national normative system. '395 So even if the con-
tracting parties expressly reference UNIDROIT, UCC, or other default
principles (sources) of contract law, national courts will interpret the
contract as merely incorporating those additional terms.396 The proper
390 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv.
741, 743-54 (1982).
391 See U.C.C. § 2B-308(b)(1) (1996) (draft):
[A] term does not become part of the contract if the term creates an obligation or
imposes a limitation on the party who did not prepare the form: (1) that [is not
consistent with customary industry practices at the time of the contract and which] a
reasonable [person in the position of the party proposing the form should know
would cause an ordinary and reasonable person in the position of the party receiving
the form] to refuse the [contract] if that term were brought to the attention of that
party.
392 See Perritt, supra note 29, at 27 ("Contract terms posted in some formal way and
subject to review or challenge might be presumptively valid, but not otherwise.").
393 MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW:
THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 120-21 (1994).
394 Id.
395 Id. at 121.
396 Id.
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law governing the contract will be determined by the private interna-
tional law of the forum.397
In contrast, arbitrators draw their authority and source(s) of law
from the contract so they are "not necessarily bound to base their deci-
sion on a particular domestic law. '398 Further, under recognized arbitral
principles of amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono,3 99 if permitted
under the arbitration clause,4°° arbitrators are free to fashion a just rem-
edy.401 This may include the application of supra-national or a-national
normative systems to the dispute or looking to existing customs of cyber-
space in resolving disputes. Thus, arbitrators, unlike judges, are free to
effectuate contracting parties' choice of substantive "law," procedure,
and forum in adjudicating the dispute to achieve a just result.402
Arbitration is a well established method of resolving contractual
disputes. The use of contract in conjunction with arbitration permits the
parties to avoid questions of jurisdiction, choice of law, venue, etc. Arbi-
tration permits the dispute to be resolved by arbitrators who are denizens
of cyberspace and who are versed in its technology, customs, and tradi-
tions. These arbitrators will likely be individuals who are well respected
in the Cyberian community. Each constituent community in cyberspace
would be free to develop its own customs and law enforced through arbi-
trators who are familiar with that community. Such arbitrators are likely
to resolve disputes in a manner that is acceptable to the parties, to give
appropriate weight to the public policy issues, and to develop a law of
cyberspace in the arbitral award.
Arbitration is also relatively inexpensive vis-a-vis litigation in tradi-
tional courts; procedures may be created that fully utilize the flexibility
of cyberspace technology, and because arbitration is a well established
method of resolving disputes, there are existing "real world" mechanisms
397 Id. at 122.
398 Id. at 124-26.
399 "The... two terms--amiable compositeur and ex aequo et bono authorize the arbitra-
tor to depart from the application of the law in terms of what is regarded as just or equitable
under the circumstances. Both terms are used because they had different connotations in vari-
ous national legal systems." Duane W. Krohnke, Decisions Standards Raise Policy Issues as
Minnesota Drafts an ADR Code of Ethics, 15 ALTERNATVES TO HiGH COST LrnG. 3, 6 (Jan.
1997) (citing M. PELLONPAA & D. CARON, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RuLFs As INTER-
PRETED AND APPLIED: SELECrED PROBLEMS IN LIGHT OF THE PRACTICE OF TH IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMs TRIBUNAL, 93-95 (1994)).
400 See, e.g. Art. 29(3), AAA International Arbitration Rules ('The tribunal shall not de-
cide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono unless the parties have expressly authorized it
to do so.").
401 See Alejandro M. Garro, The Contribution of UNIDROIT Principles to the Advance-
ment ofInternational Commercial Arbitration, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & Coup. L. 93, 114-15, 128 n.
98 (1995); Karyn S. Weinberg, Note, Equity in International Arbitration: How Fair is "Fair"?
A Study of Lex Mercatoria and Amiable Composition, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 227, 240 (1994).
402 Garro, supra note 401, at 124-26.
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to enforce arbitral awards on both domestic and foreign jurisdictions. 4°3
Accordingly, the arbitration model is most likely to produce decisions
that are accepted by Cyberians as legitimate and by the real world as
enforceable.
Because arbitration is a creature of contract law, the parties' sub-
mission and the contract circumscribes the scope of the arbitrator's juris-
diction and the arbitrator's ability to fashion a remedy; therefore,
arbitration suffers from the same inherent danger of "overreaching" by
the stronger or more sophisticated party, if standard form contracts are
used to provide for arbitration. 40 4 However, this article offers only a
general caveat. Otherwise, these questions in the arbitral context are
beyond its scope.
A. THE VIRTUAL MAGISTRATE PROJECT
Currently, there are several attempts at pilot projects to resolve dis-
putes in cyberspace.405 The Online Ombuds Office4 6 and Virtual Mag-
istrate Project 40 7 are two of the better known pilot projects. The Online
Ombuds Office does not adjudicate disputes; rather, it serves as a media-
tor that assists the disputants in resolving the conflict. Because the On-
line Ombuds Office does not issue rulings, this section will consider the
Virtual Magistrate Project in detail.
The Virtual Magistrate Project (VMP) possibly provides the initial
footsteps towards dispute resolution in cyberspace, which hopes, through
the persuasive force of the magistrates's well reasoned arbitral awards,
the VMP will eventually evolve into a law of cyberspace. The VMP was
developed in 1995.408 The VMP anticipates that disputes in cyberspace
403 See Federal Arbitration Act §§ 1-15, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1992); Act of July 31, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1992); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 1958, (reprinted in 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-08 (West
1992)) (95 countries are signatories to this convention); Michael H. Strub, Jr., Note, Resisting
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York
Convention: A Proposal for Effective Guidelines, 68 Tax. L. REv. 1031, 1036 (1990).
404 See generally Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Fi-
nancial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 267 (1995); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1945 (1996); James L. Guill & Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Rush to
Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, 28(3) JUDGES' J. 8 (1989); Kronstein, supra note 38.
405 Both projects are funded by The National Center for Automated Information Research
(NCR), cooperate with each other, and make cross referrals, if appropriate.
406 See Online Ombuds Office (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://www.ombuds.org>.
407 See Virtual Magistrate Project (visited Apr. 24, 1997) <http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/
>; see also George H. Friedman, Internet & Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Match Made in
Cyberspace, 2(9) MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST 6 (1996). For a general discussion of the VMP,
see George H. Friedman & Robert Gellman, An Information Superhighway "On Ramp" for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38 (1996).
408 See Virtual Magistrate Project: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 20, 1995)
<http://www.vmag.law.vilI.edu:8080/> [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
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will involve users of on-line systems, systems operators, and claims of
injury that are caused by wrongful messages, postings, and files.409 The
project takes advantage of the unique characteristics of the Internet. As a
global dispute resolution service existing solely in cyberspace, it can re-
solve disputes without having to work within the laws of any particular
jurisdiction.410 The VMP provides for fast, accessible, inexpensive, in-
formal, temporary resolution of on-line disputes.411 The VMP will pro-
vide dispute resolution services globally if the parties agree to have the
dispute resolved by the virtual magistrate. 412 The VMP is committed to
maximum public availability about information on its decisions and ac-
tivities. 413 The Cyber Law Institute directs policy for the VMP.414 The
American Arbitration Association administrates all cases submitted to
the Virtual Magistrate.415 The Villanova Center for Information Law
and Policy operates the Virtual Magistrate Service, 416 and the NCR pro-
vides its funding.417
B. GoALs OF THE VMP
The goals of the VMP are to determine whether on-line resolution
of on-line disputes is practicable; provide system operators with neutral
and expert opinions that respond to claims of wrongful postings; lay the
groundwork for a self-sustaining on-line dispute resolution system; de-
fine the reasonable response of a system operator who is faced with a
complaint; explore whether the VMP could be extended to resolve other
grievances in the on-line world; and develop a formal structure for a
permanent Virtual Magistrate program.4 18
C. SUBJECT MIATTER OF THE VMP
A Virtual Magistrate may adjudicate almost any on-line problem.
The scope of the Virtual Magistrate's jurisdiction seems to be focused on
content and intellectual property issues. 419 A virtual magistrate has sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over complaints about copyright or trademark in-
409 Id.
410 Whether it is possible to have a-national arbitration without reference to either a situs
or the lex loci arbitri that produces an enforceable arbitral award is questionable. See Hans
Smit, A-National Arbitration, TUL. L. REv. 629 (1989).
411 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 See Virtual Magistrate Project: Concept Paper (visited Feb. 26, 1996) <http:/l
www.vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/> [hereinafter Concept Paper 1].
415 Id.
416 Id.
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id.
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fringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, fraud,
deceptive trade practices, inappropriate materials (obscene, lewd, or ma-
terial that otherwise violates system rules), invasion of privacy, and other
wrongful content.420 A virtual magistrate may also consider whether it is
appropriate for a system operator to deny user access to an on-line
system.421
D. JURISDICTION OF THE VMP
A virtual magistrate only has jurisdiction over parties who agree to
have him or her arbitrate the dispute.422 The Virtual Magistrate process
is voluntary, and his or her power to review a dispute and fashion a
remedy is strictly governed by the agreement of the parties. The parties
choose which issues to submit to the magistrate and the scope of the
.magistrate's power to fashion a remedy. 423 However, as with other arbi-
tration proceedings, the magistrate does have some inherent powers once
the issue is submitted.424 The magistrate has no means or power to en-
force his award ("judgment"). But arbitration decisions are frequently
recognized and enforced by courts throughout the world.425 Individuals
participating in this process should realize that a virtual magistrate's de-
cision has "teeth" and may be enforceable in real courts.426 Unlike real
courts, the decisions by the magistrate are not subject to appeal,427 but
the parties may request that the magistrate reconsider a decision.428
The VMP presumes that system operators will, through standard
user contracts, require that disputes be referred to the Virtual Magistrate
- including disputes between users.429 For example, a term in a stan-
dard user contract may require users to resolve any dispute in cyber-
space through a virtual magistrate's condition of access. Individual
users, sysops, or third-parties may refer disputes on an ad hoc basis. In
420 See Virtual Magistrate Project Concept Paper (visited Feb. 26, 1996) <http:ll
www.vmag.vclip.org:8080/docs/vmpaper.html> [hereinafter Concept Paper 2].
421 See generally Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
422 Id. An arbitration is a proceeding to settle a dispute where two or more parties having
an interest in the dispute submit the issue for determination to an individual or group (the
arbitrator(s)). Unlike a court, the power of the arbitrator is not derived from the government
but rather from the consent of the private parties who submit the issue to arbitration. An
arbitration clause derives its power from two sources: (1) the agreement of the parties submit-
ting the issue to arbitration; and (2) the power of the government which enforces legal
processes. See Strub, supra note 403, at 1035 n.28.
423 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Concept Paper 1, supra note 414.
428 Id.
429 As discussed earlier, standard form contracts are an inherently dangerous basis on
which to create law or justice.
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cases involving third-parties, for example, the VMP will request that the
third party consent to jurisdiction.430 Over time, with the establishment
of an industry-wide protocol that provides for the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution.techniques to resolve disputes, there may be a contractual
agreement between parties (subscribers and providers) to submit disputes
to the virtual magistrate. 431
E. CHOICE OF LAW OF VMP
In reaching a decision, a magistrate may consider network etiquette,
applicable contracts, and appropriate substantive laws without automati-
cally applying the law of any specific legal jurisdiction.432 The magis-
trate will consider the circumstances of each complaint, the views of the
parties about applicable legal principles and remedies, and the likely out-
come in any ultimate litigation or dispute resolution.433 Decisions of one
magistrate will not necessarily be -treated as binding precedent for other
cases; however, the parties to an arbitration proceeding will be bound by
the decision and may not relitigate the identical matter through the Vir-
tual Magistrate. Eventually through the persuasive force and weight of
well reasoned arbitral opinions, a body of customary law may
develop.434
F, THE VIRTUAL MAGISTRATES
The American Arbitration Association and a subcommittee of the
fellows of the Cyberspace Law Institute select the magistrates. There-
fore, it follows that they are not "real judges" with the power of a gov-
ernment organization behind their awards. Magistrates are paid
volunteers who offer their services to resolve disputes in cyberspace.435
A single magistrate is selected randomly from a pool of qualified and
trained arbitrators. 436 Sometimes a case may be referred to a panel of
three arbitrators. 437
Magistrates are required to be familiar with the Virtual Magistrate
Rules, the Virtual Magistrate Handbook for Magistrates, the American
Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules, and the American
Arbitration Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
430 Concept Paper 1, supra note 414.
431 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
432 Concept Paper 1, supra note 414.
433 Id.
434 There is no reason that the VM's award could not be final so that the matter could not
also be relitigated in the courts.
435 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
436 Concept Paper 1, supra note 414.
437 Id.
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Disputes. 438 Magistrates must be knowledgeable about the law and on-
line systems.439 Magistrates must comply with a code of conduct that
requires neutrality and provides for recusal from cases where they may
be perceived to have an interest.
G. PROCEDURE
To commence a proceeding before a magistrate, a complaint must
be filed by e-mail.440 Currently, there is a $10 filing fee to discourage
frivolous filings.44 1 The complaint should describe the nature of the dis-
puted activity or conduct and the identity of all the parties.442 Optimally,
the complaint will contain: (1) the name, affiliation, address, and elec-
tronic mail address of the complainant(s), system operator(s), or other
relevant individuals; (2) a description of the disputed action, posting, or
conduct; (3) the nature of the objection; and (4) copies of relevant mater-
ials.443 Any participating party may, with the permission of the magis-
trate, proceed without revealing the identity of a participant. 4 Also a
complainant may request that the complaint remain confidential.445
Once a complaint is filed, the AAA staff reviews it to ensure that the
complaint is complete before accepting it and referring it to a magis-
trate." 6 Each case is assigned its own listserv/newsgroup called a
"grist."4 7 The magistrate and the participants are registered to the grist
and receive all messages posted to it.44 8 Submissions from the parties
and communications from the magistrate are sent through the grist."49
All messages sent through are captured and saved at the Villanova
Center for Information Law and Policy. While the case is being consid-
ered, the parties may access the messages through the docket system on
the World Wide Web.450 The goal of the project is to decide cases
within three days. However, the parties are free to agree upon a different
time schedule.451 The magistrate will not make the complaint public un-
til a decision is reached.452 The parties to a complaint are not prohibited
438 Virtual Magistrate Project: Virtual Handbook for Magistrates (visited Feb. 26, 1996)
<http://www.vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/> [hereinafter Virtual Handbook].
439 Concept Paper 1, supra note 414.
440 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
441 Id.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Virtual Handbook, supra note 438.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449 Id.
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 408.
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from discussing their participation during this period.453 If a complaint
or a response to a complaint contains confidential information, then the
Magistrate may decide that the information can be withheld. 454 Parties
that have access to confidential information will be required to abide by
confidentiality rulings.455 All decisions are public. 4 56
VIII. FACT-FINDING IN CYBERSPACE
While existing laws and contract paradigm may provide a sound
legal basis on which to build an arbitral dispute resolution regime in
cyberspace, it is not clear that existing technology lends itself to sound
decision making processes.457 If disputes in cyberspace are essentially
requests for the arbitrator to rule on "summary judgment" motions, i.e.
there is no dispute of material fact so that it is merely a question of what
are the legal rights of the parties, then Computer Mediated Communica-
tions (CMC) may not affect the adjudicatory process: But, if questions
of credibility must be resolved and the arbitrator must make findings of
fact then the old adage that "the medium is the message"458 takes on a
special significance. Perhaps, the best historical example of this point of
"the medium creating the message" is the 1960 Richard M. Nixon v.
John F. Kennedy Presidential debates.459 Individuals who heard the de-
bates on the radio thought that then-Vice-President Nixon won, while
individuals who watched the debates on television thought that then-Sen-
ator Kennedy won the debate.460 Some scholars consider the Nixon-
Kennedy debates as the defining moment of the 1960 presidential elec-
453 Id.
454 Id.
4 5 5 Id
456 Id
457 Further, future teleconferencing and other technological innovations may render these
concerns moot or raise new questions in time. See Parks, supra note 313 at 93 ('The reduced-
cues perspective may simply become a theoretic antique, given the continuing advances in
network technology."). A full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
458 MARSHALL McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THm ExTENsIONS OF MAN 23 (2d ed.
1964).
459 It is unnecessary to go back to 1960, the reader's personal experiences may also sup-
port this point, consider seeing the same movie, on a large screen in a theater versus on a small
screen television in a livingroom. Many readers will agree that these are vastly different ex-
periences that may affect how they evaluate movies.
460 R. HARRISON, BEYOND WORDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION
172-75 (1974); P. BOLLER, JR., PRESmENAL CAMPAIoNS 298-99 (1984) ("Radio listeners
had the impression that Nixon did as well as, if not better than, Kennedy in the confrontation;
but televiewers, including Nixon's own fans, generally agreed that Kennedy came out ahead in
the first debate."). Cf. M. CASSATA & T. SKILL, TELEVISION: A GUIDE TO THE LrERATURE 8
(1985) ("No one can deny, for instance, that in the televised 1960 presidential campaign de-
bates, Nixon's haggard appearance, capped by a heavy growth of 'five o'clock shadow,' tipped
the 1960 election scales in favor of the more alert, clean-cut Kennedy.").
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tion.461 A moment that was defined by the medium of television. Sci-
ence and human experience dictate that the medium may define or create
the message.
Initially in its crudest form, arbitration in cyberspace will consist of
an e-mail exchange of copies of documents, 462 and responses to the arbi-
trator's or opposing party's questions. In essence, the arbitration will be
an exchange of email. Based on this evidence, the arbitrator will make
the award. Already, this process is too crude and fails to take complete
advantage of the medium. Currently, real-time questioning of witnesses
is possible using "chat" programs, and inexpensive real-time audio-video
teleconferencing is increasingly available.
For the purposes of this discussion, the author assumes that the arbi-
tration will be using a chat program to interrogate witnesses and to re-
ceive witness responses; the author further assumes that one or more
witnesses's credibility is at issue. As Professor Berch noted the "tran-
scription" of the testimony will result in
some part of the communication [being] lost, because
speakers use more than words to communicate: they rely
upon a shared understanding of the metacommunicative
frame in which the utterance is made. In addition to spo-
ken words, this frame is indicated by paralinguistic fea-
tures such as pitch, rhythm, and intonation, as well as
visual features such as head nods, hand gestures and
posture.463
Accordingly, up to 93% of witness communication may be lost by tran-
scribing spoken words into ASCII symbols for transmission to the
arbitrator.464
The law recognizes the importance of nonverbal communication. A
fact-finder may consider the manner and demeanor of a witness in evalu-
ating testimony.4 65 As one appellate court found:
461 B. RUBIN, POLITICAL TELEVISION 18-20 (1967).
462 Document is being used in the broadest sense and includes both traditional paper doc-
uments and electronic documents such as e-mail or computer files.
463 Rebecca White Berch, A Proposal to Amend Rule 30(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Cross-Disciplinary and Empirical Evidence Supporting Presumptive Use of Video
to Record Depositions, 59 FORDHAm L. REV. 347, 347 (1990) (footnotes and citations omit-
ted). Professor Berch also found that lawyers prefer stenographic transcription of depositions
to video depositions because stenographic transcription allows the attorney to shield the jury
from unfavorable characteristics of the witness. Id. at 350.
464 Id. at 360 & n.67 (Ninety-three percent of all communication is non-verbal).
465 Cannon v. Cannon, 80 F. Supp. 79, 80 (D.D.C. 1936) ("Experience has demonstrated
that one of the surest ways to determine the credibility of any witness is to observe the manner
and demeanor of that witness on the stand."); EDWARD J. DEvrrr, CHARLES B. BLACKmAR,
MICHAEL A. WOLFF, FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 73.01 (1987).
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The judge before whom the cause was tried heard the
testimony, observed the appearance and bearing of the
witnesses and their manner of testifying, and was much
better qualified to pass upon the credibility and weight
of their testimony than this court can be. There are many
comparatively trifling appearances and incidents, lights
and shadows, which are not preserved in the record,
which may well have affected the mind of the judge as
well as the jury in forming opinions of the weight of the
evidence, the character and credibility of the witnesses,
and of the very right and justice of the case. These con-
siderations cannot be ignored in determining whether the
judge exercised a reasonable discretion or abused his
discretion in granting or refusing a motion for a new
trial.466
In Cyberian arbitration, there may only be words without a context
before the arbitrator.467
The obvious response is televideo conferencing. But, these cues can
also be affected by the technology, for example the placement of a cam-
era. A truthful witness tends to face the questioner directly. If the cam-
era is located on an angle to the questioner, and the witness looks at the
camera while being questioned, the fact finder may misinterpret this as
deceit.468 And as at least one judge observed, "[i]n order to present even
a normal appearance, most [people] must be made up or otherwise pre-
pared" for the camera.469 Moreover, in one study comparing radio, tele-
vision, and newspaper, researchers discovered that radio listeners were
able to detect deception 73.4% of the time, newspaper readers 64.2%,
and television viewers 51.8%.470 This study does not support televideo-
conferencing as the superior alternative. Another example, pauses and
hesitations are associated with deceit; but in CMC, the pause or hesita-
tion may be merely a communications lag caused by the technology and
not the speaker. Computer Mediated Communications has a dramatic
466 Berch, supra note 463, at 401 n.76 (quoting Coppo v. Van Wieringen, 217 P.2d 294,
297 (1950) (quoting McLimans v. City of Lancaster, 15 N.W. 194, 195 (Wis. 1883)).
467 See Berch, supra note 463, at 362-71 (Professor Berch discusses in detail the impor-
tance of visual and paralinguistic communication in making credibility determinations.).
468 Id. at 364; Benjamin V. Madison 11I, Note, Seeing Can Be Deceiving: Photographic
Evidence in a Visual Age-How Much Weight Does it Deserve, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv 705,
731-34 & n.177 (1984).
469 Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 508 (8th Cir. 1972)(Heaney, J. dissenting).
470 Richard Wiseman, The Megalab Truth Test, 373 NATURE 391 (Feb. 2, 1995). This
study's methodology has been criticized. Oliver Braddick, Distinguishing Truth from Lies,
374 NATuRE 315 (Mar. 23, 1995). Professor Wiseman's study is extremely interesting be-
cause it involved 41,471 subjects and attempted to move from laboratory research into the
"real world."
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impact on interpersonal and group dynamics. In asynchronous commu-
nication, the speaker experiences less stressful conversational demands
so it is easier for the speaker to edit the response to adopt communication
behaviors and disclosures that are more stereotypically desirable.47 1 An-
other effect of CMC is that "removing the physical presence of others
diminishes the influence a unanimous majority has on the opinion of an
individual. The results further imply that in a CMC environment, sub-
jects may be more critical and more willing to evaluate the information
they are receiving. '4 72 Linguistic studies using mock jurors as subjects
demonstrate that "[e]ven minor differences such as dialect, accent, voice
quality, and linguistic fluency are related to how a listener views the
speaker's trustworthiness, "likability," and benevolence.
4 73
The effects of the interaction between the communications media
and fact finding is especially problematic in the arbitral context.47 4 Gen-
erally, arbitrators are free to ignore rules of evidence and other formali-
ties. 47 5 Accordingly, unlike a judicial court which must affirmatively
evaluate admissibility of evidence against the rules of evidence, arbitra-
tors are free to let it all in and to sort it out, if they so desire, without
formally weighing the impact of the media on the message.
The author is aware of the danger of extrapolating from a few lin-
guistic studies in a laboratory setting to that of the cyberspace arbitral
forum. But, these studies should at least cause individuals, involved in
cyberspace fact-finding to consider if there are inherent limitations in the
media and if so, how to best compensate for these limitations. Therefore,
further studies of the fact finding and "judicial" decision making in CMC
environments are needed.
471 Joseph B. Walther, Impression Development in Computer-Mediated Interaction, 57
W. J. OF COmm. 381, 394 (1993). The author assumes that these responses would also be more
favorably received by the arbitrator.
472 Michael Smilowitz et al., The Effects of Computer Mediated Communication on an
Individual's Judgment: A Study Based on the Methods of Asch's Social Influence Experiment,
4 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 311, 319 (1988).
473 Charles M. Grabau and Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic
Minorities: Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 227, 314-15 (1996)
(citation omitted).
474 Perhaps also in the cyberspace mediation context, "the opportunity to hear someone's
voice or to look him or her in the eye changes how bargains are negotiated or whether any real
bargaining occurs." Sara Kiesler et al., Social Psychological Aspects of Computer-Mediated
Communication, 39 Am. Psy. 1123, 1132 (1984).
475 Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516, UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974). See gen-
erally Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman, HI, Selected Topics in Securities Arbi-
tration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive
Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 Tu.ANE L. REv 1547, 1580-81
(1991).
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IX. CONCLUSION
Cyberspace is facing the challenge of becoming civilized and set-
tled. The Wild West approach of community sanctions and shoot-'em-
up flame wars no longer meets the needs of its inhabitants, but then
neither does government regulation-the middle course, self-regulation
best effectuates both the vision of the founders of cyberspace and the
pragmatic needs of the real world. The original settlers have established
a strong civil libertarian paradigm. Like the Old West, the "old cyber-
space" had virtually unlimited resources and only a few individuals com-
peting for access to those resources. This situation has now changed.
The population is increasing at an almost exponential rate, and the de-
mand for an increased bandwidth for new services is increasing even
faster. In the future, there may not be enough room in cyberspace for
each person to go out and do his or her own thing. Perhaps, someday in
the future, Cyberians will have to sacrifice some freedoms. But that day
is not yet here; currently, the cyberspace infrastructure is evolving apace
with the social need for protection.
Technology provides individuals with effective, albeit not prefect,
protection from the dangers of cyberspace. But even cyberspace technol-
ogy is unable to protect people from themselves, so proper socialization
is a prerequisite for effective technological solutions. For those dangers
from which technology and individual initiative do not provide adequate
protection, contract law or social enforcement mechanisms provide a
sound basis for creating a "law" of cyberspace. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes so aptly observed "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience. '476 Given time, we may have sufficient experience
with cyberspace to justify general legislation to govern it. Until then,
first do no harm. So the core principles of the law of cyberspace should
be based on the contract law model of private law making.
Cyberians will be surrendering substantial rights through contract to
private government; therefore, the contracts must be intrinsically just
(because there is a meeting of the minds) or extrinsically just (because
the contract is fair). Hence, the current vogue of shrinkwrapping con-
tracts in cyberspace must end. Contracting parties must take advantage
of the technological options in cyberspace that reduce the transaction
costs of negotiating contracts so that each contract represents the unique
meeting of the minds - or at least a meeting of the electronic agents.
The unique transnational nature of cyberspace suggests that disputes
in cyberspace should be resolved initially through arbitration. But be-
cause adjudication in cyberspace will be a creature of contract, Cyberians
should knowingly consent to the jurisdiction of the "court" and the ap-
476 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 14 AM. L. REv. 233, 234 (1880) (book review).
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pointment of the arbitrator. The arbitrator, while deriving power from
the contract, should interpret each contract according to the contract prin-
ciples of good faith and reasonableness. Additionally, the arbitrator
should support core values that protect human dignity and personal free-
dom. Given time, these contracts and the decisions interpreting them
may mature into a common law of cyberspace. Arbitration avoids diffi-
cult choice of law, forum, venue, and jurisdiction issues and may provide
for "expertise" adjudication of disputes in areas where the adjudicator
should be familiar with technology, customs, law, and be prepared to
develop a law of cyberspace that is based on well-reasoned persuasive
arbitral awards.
Finally, some acts in cyberspace have such a disproportionate im-
pact in the real world outside of cyberspace that existing laws governing
the real world should govern these acts. But for those crimes or torts,
existing law is sufficient. In the end, there is simply no need for sui
generis laws for cyberspace.
X. POST SCRIPT - RENO v. AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION477
Recently, the United States Supreme Court had the last word on the
Communications Decency Act.478 The Court affirmed the holding of
two three-judge district court panels that provisions of the CDA violated
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.479 The Court
477 1997 WL 348012 (U.S.). The court found provisions of the CDA unconstitutional in a
7-2 decision. The dissenting justices concurred that the "display," "indecency transmission,"
and "specific person provisions" as applied to more than one adult were unconstitutional. Id.
at *27 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
478 Unless the proponents of the CDA unwisely return to Congress seeking CDA-H or
Son-of-CDA.
479 See American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd 1997 WL
348012; Shea on behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd 65 U.S.L.W. 3323 (1997).
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rejected 47. U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii), 480  § 223(d)481  (West Supp.
1997) as overbroad 482 without reaching the Fifth Amendment Due Pro-
cess argument483 or reaching the question of whether the unique charac-
teristics of cyberspace prohibit any congressional legislation.484
A. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The Court looked to the troika of cases upon which the United
States' arguments rested: Ginsberg v. New York,485 FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,486 and Renton v. Playtime Theatres,487 and rejected the gov-
ernment's contentions. 488
480 Section 223(a) prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to
any recipient under 18 years of age. It provides that:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which
is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used
for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
481 Section 223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age. It provides that:
(d) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons
under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
482 1994 WL 328012, *14-*16.
483 Id. at *10, *14.
484 Id. at *10 n. 30.
485 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
486 438 US. 726 (1978).
487 475 U.S. 41 (1981).
488 1994 WL 328012,*10-*12.
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1. Ginsberg v. New York
In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court rejected the defendants' broad
reaching claim that freedom of expression cannot depend on whether a
citizen is an adult or minor.489 "In rejecting that contention [the Court]
relied not only on the State's independent interest in the well-being of
youth, but also [its] constant recognition of the principle that 'the par-
ents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
children is basic in the structure of our society. '490 The Court distin-
guished the CDA from the New York State statute considered in Gins-
berg on four grounds.
(1) The statute in Ginsberg did not bar parents from purchasing "in-
decent" materials for their children. In contrast, under the CDA neither
the parents consent nor participation is a defense.
(2) The New York statute only applied to commercial transactions,
and the CDA applies to all distribution of indecency whether commer-
cial, not-for-profit, personal or social.
(3) The New York statute defined "indecency" as "utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors" while the CDA fails to provide
any definition of the term. And,
(4) The New York statute applied to persons under the age of 17
while the CDA adds an additional year by applying to persons under the
age of 18.491
After distinguishing the CDA from the New York statute, the Court held
that the statute in Ginsberg was substantially narrower than the CDA.
2. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
In FCC v. Pacifica, the Court upheld a declaratory order of the
Federal Communications Commission holding that recording of a come-
dic performance could be subject to administrative sanctions. 492 The
FCC found that repetitive use of vulgar words referring to excretory,
sexual activities or organs in the afternoon was patently offensive. In
examining the regulation in the context of a pervasively regulated com-
munications medium, the Court noted that "the First Amendment does
not prohibit all government regulation that depends on the content of
speech," so whether an indecent broadcast monologue is entitled to con-
stitutional protection depends on the context of the broadcast.493 "'[O]f
all forms of communications broadcasting ha[s] received the most lim-
489 Id. at 10.
490 Id. at 11 & n.31.
491 Id. at *11.
492 Id.
493 Id.
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ited First Amendment protection. '494 "[T]he Court concluded that the
ease with which children may obtain access to broadcasts, 'coupled with
the concerns recognized in Ginsberg," justified special treatment of inde-
cent broadcasting. '495
The Court distinguished Pacifica on three grounds.
(1) Radio stations had been regulated for decades and the agency
targeted a specific program to designate when-rather than if similar
programs could be aired. 'The CDA's broad categorical prohibitions are
not limited to specific times [and] are not dependent on any evaluation
by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet."
(2) The FCC's order was not punitive while violation of the CDA
subjects the violator to substantial criminal penalties.
(3) The FCC's order applied to an industry that had been histori-
cally regulated because warnings could not adequately protect the lis-
tener. In contrast, there is little chance of being accidently exposed to
indecency in cyberspace, and there is no history of government regula-
tion in cyberspace.
3. Reton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
In Reton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court upheld a zoning ordi-
nance designed to prevent crime and deteriorating property values - the
secondary effects of adult theatres. The Court rejected the government's
argument that the CDA was a cyberzoning ordinance. Unlike the statute
in Renton which was aimed at the secondary effects of the adult movie
industry, the CDA focuses on protecting minors from the primary effects
of indecent speech.496
B. A NEW MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION
After distinguishing the precedent cited by the United States, the
Court then applied a medium specific analysis,497 and found that unlike
radio or television, the "democratic fora of the Internet [have never] been
494 Id. at *12.
495 Id. at *12 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50).
496 Id. at 12.
497 1997 WL 348012, *13 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557 (1975)). Unfortunately, the Court did not adopt as a matter of general First Amendment
jurisprudence that as communications industry develops new media such technology will pre-
sumptively enjoy a high level of protection. For example, Professor Tribe proposed a Twenty-
Seventh Amendment:
this Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and as-
sembly, and its protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the depri-
vation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, shall be construed as
fully applicable without regard to the technological method or medium through
which information content is generated, stored, altered, transmitted, or controlled.
Tribe, supra note 42, at 39.
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subject to the government supervision and regulation that has attended
the broadcast industry. '498 The cyberspace is neither an invasive me-
dium nor a scarce resource.499 The court then concluded that there was
"no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied to this medium."5 °° Accordingly, cyberspace is enti-
tled the highest level of First Amendment protection accorded to the
traditional print media or the conversations of private citizens within
their own homes.
C. OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS
The Court found that:
the breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly unprece-
dented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg50 1
and Pacifica,50 2 the scope of the CDA is not limited to
commercial speech or commercial organizations. Its
open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit organi-
zations and individuals posting indecent messages or
displaying them on their own computers in the presence
of minors. The general unqualified term "indecent" and
"patently offensive" cover large amounts of
nonpornographic material with serious educational or
other value.50 3
Moreover, the CDA subjected the violator to trial in the "community
most likely to be offended by the message." 504 Yet, the CDA does not
define "indecent" or "patently offensive as measured by contemporary
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." 50 5 It is unclear how
the two standards relate to each other. The vagueness of the CDA raises
special First Amendment concerns. Such vagueness chills free speech,
and because the CDA is a criminal statute, in addition to the stigma of a
criminal conviction, its severe sanctions may cause speakers to remain
498 Id. (citation omitted). Because the appellees did not press the issue before the Court,
the court declined the reach Judge Dalzell's observation that the characteristics of the Internet
"lead to the conclusion that Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet ...." Id. at
*10 n.30 (quoting 929 F. Supp. at 877).
499 Id.
500 Id. at *14.
501 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
502 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
503 1997 WL 348012, *17 (emphasis added). The implication may be that the govern-
ment can regulation commerical speech in cyberspace but not non-commerical speech of indi-
viduals or organizations.
504 Id.
505 Id. at 14.
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silent rather than "communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas,
and images. '506
The Court rejected the United States' contentions that the CDA is
no more vague than the Miller v. California obscenity test.50 7 The
United States argued that "indecency" and "patently offensive" is the
second prong of the Miller test. But the CDA lacks the key limiting
provision "specifically defined by applicable state law," and in addition
to applying to "sexual conduct," also applies to "excretory activities and
sexual and excretory organs.508 Further, the second prong's requirement
that the work "lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" allows the federal court to set a national floor for socially redeem-
ing value.50 9 The CDA contains no similar provisions. Because a more
carefully drafted statute or less restrictive alternatives are possible, the
Court concluded that the CDA imposed an unacceptable burden on adult
speech.510
D. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Perhaps, the Court's new use of the phrase "commercial speech"
foreshadows a change in constitutional jurisprudence. 511 Traditionally,
the Court used the term "commercial speech" to describe "advertise-
ments" or other communications (speech) in conjunction with the sales
of goods or services.5 12 In cyberspace the commercial speech may also
be commercial content. The two are not easily separable. In American
Civil Liberties Union, the court used the term to refer to speech or con-
tent provided by commercial providers.5 13 This poses the question,
506 Id.
507 (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 15 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24)(intemal quotation marks and citations omitted in
original).
508 1997 WL 348012, *15.
509 Id. at *15.
510 One such less restrictive alternative is the use of tagging or blocking software. See id.
at 24-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Author's
note: In cyberspace, the least restrictive test will almost always be met by a technological
solution that focuses on the content receiver rather than the content provider. Only the content
receiver is in a position to know what content is objectionable.
511 Id.
512 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
513 See American Civil Liberties Union, 1997 WL 348012, *7 n.23 (distinguishing be-
tween commercial and non-commercial content providers). *10-*12 (distinguishing Ginsberg
because it applied only to commercial content providers); *13 (distinguishing Sable because it
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whether the Court for reasons of style or through inadvertence used a
technical term in the colloquial sense or whether the Court signaled a
change in constitutional jurisprudence. The strongest argument against
the Court expanding the definition of "commercial speech" is that the
dissenting opinion did not remark upon it. The strongest argument for
the expanded definition is the repeated new use of "commercial speech"
in the context of the first United States Supreme Court opinion by an
experienced justice considering cyberspace, a new and novel communi-
cations medium, strongly suggests that the Court has added a new wrin-
ke to the term "commercial speech." Justice Stevens has authored six
commercial speech opinions for the Court, one in each of the last two
terms.514 This suggests that Justice Stevens is aware of the parameters of
the phrase "commercial speech" used in its traditional sense.
The Court in American Civil Liberties Union is making that com-
mon sense distinction between speech made by individuals or not-for-
profit groups and commercial organizations. Although, the use of the
term "commercial speech" in this context appears novel, the Court has
drawn this distinction between text and metatext before. The difference
is between speech that exists to vindicate constitutional rights and speech
that is for pecuniary gain. The classic example of this involves attorney
solicitation cases. The Court has uniformly held that an attorney solicit-
ing a (potential) client in order to litigate for a not-for-profit entity that
exists for the purpose of vindicating constitutional rights is protected
speech.515 Yet, the Court has upheld such statutes when the attorney was
motivated by pecuniary interests.5 16 Similarly in cyberspace, the court
applied to commercial telephone communications); *15 (distinguishing Miller because it ap-
plied to commercial vendors); *17 (distinguishing "the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and
Pacifica, [because] the scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial
entities."); and *19 (distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speakers).
514 See, e.g., Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,
1997 WL 345357, 65 USLW 4597 (1997); Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 44
(1996); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Com'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91 (1990); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
515 Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has not tolerated
the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the con-
duct of commercial affairs. The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447,
that the State may proscribe in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circum-
stances likely to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant's
activity on behalf of the ACLU. Although a showing of potential danger may suffice
in the former context, appellant may not be disciplined unless her activity in fact
involved the type of misconduct at which South Carolina's broad prohibition is said
to be directed.
In re Edna Smith Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978); National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963)..
516 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) ("In-person
solicitation by a lawyer of remunerative employment is a business transaction in which speech
is an essential but subordinate component. While this does not remove the speech from the
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may wish to be especially solicitous of speech made for individual, not-
for-profit, or educational purposes in the absence of pecuniary motives
versus speech that exists as commercial content for sale.
The truism of cyberspace is that everyone is potentially a content
provider and consumer and in many ways access to cyberspace is equal
for all.517 Yet, it does not necessarily follow that the law must impose
the same liabilities and duty on all content providers. While it may be
reasonable to force commercial providers "to cope with the community
standards of every hamlet into which their goods may wander,"518 it
would not be reasonable to ask each individual to anticipate the commu-
nity mores of every geographic location from which some person could
access content and to be prepared to defend that speech in every ham-
let.5 19 Accordingly, the Court may be preparing to recognize in cyber-.
space the existing realities of speech in the real world.
protection of the First Amendment... it lowers the level of appropriate judicial scrutiny."). It
is important to note that Primus and Ohralik were handed down together. 436 U.S. at 422.
517 Cf. Hardy, supra note 140, at 1041.
518 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
519 Randolph Stuart Sergent, The Hamlet Fallacy: Computer Networks and Geographic
Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASMNGS CoNsT. L.Q. 671 (1996).
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